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Business Lobbying as an Informational Public Good:
Can Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenses
Promote Transparency?
Michael Halberstam and Stuart Lazar
ABSTRACT
In this article, we link a proposed tax reform with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote
the kind of ‘‘information subsidy’’ that serves the public interest, while mitigating—at least to some
extent—the distortion that may result from the imbalance of financial resources on the business side
and other institutional constraints identified in the literature. We argue that businesses that lobby should
be encouraged to disclose the information that serves as a basis for their positions by allowing business
taxpayers to deduct lobbying expenses, but only to the extent that the information subsidy that a taxpay-
er’s lobbying supplies in fact educates lawmakers on policy issues. In other words, business lobbying can
be considered to supply an informational public good only where such information is made available to
all participants in the legislative process through full and timely publication. It cannot be said to supply
an informational public good where it is inserted strategically into the legislative process at a time, and in
such manner, that excludes others from using the information to assess the merits of proposed legislation
or promote contrary interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Awidely accepted account of corporate andbusiness lobbying is that K-Street serves as
the Congress’s back office by supplying costly infor-
mation and technical expertise to legislators.1 Legis-
lators and their staff,2 lobbyists,3 social scientists,4
and other observers—both critical and supportive
Michael Halberstam is an associate professor at State Univer-
sity of New York (SUNY) Buffalo Law School in Buffalo,
NY. Stuart Lazar is an associate professor at SUNY Buffalo
Law School in Buffalo, NY.
1See generally, Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, Lobby-
ing as a Legislative Subsidy, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 69
(2006) (stating that ‘‘lobbying is primarily a form of legislative
subsidy—a matching grant of costly policy information, politi-
cal intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically
selected legislators,’’ and discussing literature); see also
Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki,
David C. Kimball, and Beth C. Leech, Lobbying and
Public Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses and
Why 123 (2009).
2See, e.g., The Policy Council, Changing Of The Guard:
2007 State Of The Industry For Lobbying And Advo-
cacy 60–61 (2007) (more than two thirds of staffers surveyed
view lobbyists as either ‘‘necessary to the process,’’ as ‘‘collab-
orators,’’ or as ‘‘educators’’).
3
Bertram J. Levine, The Art of Lobbying: Building
Trust and Selling Policy 124–26 (2009); Nicholas W.
Allard, Lobbying Is An Honorable Profession: The Right To
Petition And The Competition To Be Right, 19 Stanford L.
& Policy Rev. 23, 43 (2008) (‘‘The most basic function of lob-
byists is to educate legislators.’’); Thomas Sussman, Lobby-
ing, Ethical, Though Not Bound By the Common Good, in 72
Woodstock Report (Dec. 2002), available at < http://www8
.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock/resources/articles/The-
Ethics-of-Lobbying.html > .
4Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 123; Hall and Deardorff, supra
note 1; David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups: Money, Informa-
tion and Influence, in Perspectives on Public Choice: A
Handbook 314 (1997) (‘‘Lobbying is essentially an informa-
tional activity’’) (discussing literature).
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of lobbying practices5—generally agree that lobby-
ing serves as a kind of legislative subsidy.6 On the
‘‘subsidy theory,’’ K-Street supplies critical informa-
tion and resources that help decision makers in Con-
gress understand and sort through complex policy
issues, advocate for (or against) bills,7 and oversee
the federal bureaucracy.8 As Thomas Sussman
remarks, ‘‘government has become sufficiently com-
plex that, without the information lobbyists bring
to legislators, decision-making would be—at best—
poorly informed.’’9
While more nuanced interpretations prevail in
the descriptive and empirical political science liter-
ature,10 the view that ‘‘[l]obbying is essentially an
informational activity,’’11 has persistently reinforced
the idea that lobbying provides a public good by edu-
cating legislators about policy and the consequences
of legislation.12
In this article, we link a proposed tax reform
with a substantive disclosure requirement to pro-
mote the kind of ‘‘information subsidy’’ that serves
the public interest, while mitigating—at least to
some extent—the distortion that may result from
the imbalance of financial resources on the side of
big business and other institutional constraints iden-
tified in the literature. We argue that businesses
that lobby should be encouraged to disclose the in-
formation that serves as a basis for their positions by
allowing business taxpayers to deduct lobbying
expenses, but only to the extent that the information
subsidy that a taxpayer’s lobbying supplies in fact
educates lawmakers on policy issues.13 In other
words, business lobbying can be considered to sup-
ply an informational public good, only where such
information is made available to all participants
in the legislative process through full and timely
publication. It cannot be said to supply an informa-
tional public good, where it is inserted strategically
into the legislative process at a time, and in such
manner, that excludes others from using the infor-
mation to assess the merits of proposed legislation
or promote contrary interests.14
5See, e.g., statements by U.S. Representatives Martin T. Mee-
han (D-MA) and Rahm Emanuel (D-IL) praising Senator
Russ Feingold (D-WI) for introducing the Lobbying and Ethics
Reform Act, the Senate companion to the House Lobbying and
Ethics Reform Act introduced by Meehan and Emanuel: ‘‘K
Street lobbyists have become the full-service ‘‘back office’’ of
Congress. Whether arranging and funding lavish ‘‘fact-finding’’
trips, writing major legislation, or serving as an employment
agency, special interest lobbyists are omnipresent. Professional
lobbyists have grown in number and influence, and the laws
haven’t kept pace. Just as the McCain-Feingold-Shays-Meehan
campaign finance reform put distance between donors and
members of Congress, this legislation will do the same with
K Street lobbyists and members of Congress.’’; Lessig, Repub-
lic Lost 144 (2011) (Lobbyists on behalf of special interests do
not try to convince opponents, but instead work to solidify their
base and support the work of those representatives who already
support their views to better advance them).
6Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1.
7Id. See also, Allard, supra note 3, at 43–44.
8David Epstein and Sharon O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic
Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.
L. & Econ. 227, 227 (1995).
9Sussman, supra note 3; see also, Richard Briffault, The Anxi-
ety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13
Election L. J. 160–193 (2014).
10Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 80–81 (describing several
ways in which groups with large financial resources influence
agendas and skew the process in favor of their interests).
11Austen-Smith, supra note 4, at 314 (citing literature).
12Infra notes 89, 116–124 and accompanying text.
13We acknowledge the common wisdom that, allowing a deduc-
tion for certain lobbying expenditures, may exacerbate the
inequality between the ‘‘have’’ and ‘‘have nots’’ (i.e., the busi-
nesses that have large financial resources to allocate to the
political process versus individuals and nonprofit organizations
that do not have the same amounts to devote to arguing for their
position. However, we do not argue that allowing business tax-
payers to deduct these expenditures will increase (or decrease)
the amount of lobbying that will occur. Rather, we believe that
our proposal may have the effect of shifting the type of activi-
ties conducted by businesses from ‘‘bad’’ lobbying (i.e., that
lobbying that occurs in back rooms and that provides legislators
with information not available for public inspection) with
‘‘good’’ lobbying (i.e., information made available to the public
that provides a common good and that allows those on the
opposite side of an issue to evaluate and comment on the data
and claims made by their adversaries). See infra note 113 and
accompanying text. In addition, we note that, since the enact-
ment of the reforms to Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code made in 1993 to eliminate the lobbying deduction
which had, as one of its purposes, the reduction of the power
of special interest groups, the amount spent on lobbying activ-
ities have increased significantly.
14In other words, to the extent that the usefulness of information
to the private sponsor depends on keeping it secret, or timing its
release strategically, that information should not be viewed as a
public good of the kind we should want to encourage. See
Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed
Interests And The Mobilization Of Bias In Congressional Com-
mittees, 84 The Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 797, 801 (Sept. 1990) for
the proposition that special interests strategically focus on the
committee stage where the process is often informal and subject
to less scrutiny. ‘‘Indeed, a long tradition of research on subgov-
ernments emphasizes that such clientism flourishes at the com-
mittee stage.’’ Id.
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Currently lobbying communications are not pub-
licized. We, therefore, call for the development of a
third-generation online transparency mechanism15
to address the information asymmetries that charac-
terize current institutions of congressional lobby-
ing.16 Systems for disclosing the content of the
information transmitted to legislators online have
already been proposed17 and worked out in some
detail.18 This article takes a first, incremental step
towards establishing such disclosure as a routine
practice, by incentivizing it with a specific, limited
change to the Internal Revenue Code.
We suggest that deductions for certain business
lobbying expenses be reinstated by returning to a
formulation of Section 162(e) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code similar to that which was in place from
1963 until 1993.19 The article argues that the current
version of Section 162(e) runs counter to norma-
tive tax policy, and fails to appreciate the important
role of lobbyists in satisfying legislative informa-
tion sourcing in situations where the information
they create or acquire can add to the public debate.
Moreover, the current version of Section 162(e) may,
contrary to the executive’s intent at the time of its
passage, have unwittingly skewed federal lobbying
further in favor of large business interests and
encouraged political spending by corporations.20
We argue that businesses that provide information
to Congress in an open forum should be entitled to
deduct (for tax purposes) the cost of providing that
information as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. However, the deduction should be condi-
tioned on timely disclosure of the substantive data
and policy analysis to a searchable database in stan-
dardized formats that is publicly accessible on the
web. This database could be managed by the Library
of Congress, which currently manages the much
more limited THOMAS public information system.21
We preface our discussion with several disclaim-
ers. First, while our focus in this article is on the
nature of the information subsidy that lobbying
provides to the Congress, we do not privilege this
account of lobbying over all other accounts. We agree
with academics22 and practitioners,23 who point out
that lobbying serves different functions at different
times with different players.24
15We use the term ‘‘third-generation transparency’’ in the
sense developed by Fung et al. Archon Fung, Mary
Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The
Perils and Promise of Transparency (2007). See Mi-
chael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform
in Local Redistricting, 11 Elect. L. J. 446, 466–449 (2012)
(discussing the theory and its application in the redistricting
context).
16The legislature is typically viewed as an institution that is sep-
arate from lobbying, even as it is recognized that lobbying is a
service that is integrated into the day-to-day ‘‘production of leg-
islation.’’ Gregory Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneur-
ship In The U.S. House Of Representatives 3 (2003).
We here treat the legislator and outside lobbyists as part of
the same institution.
17See, e.g., Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Yoav Hammer, Lobbying
and the Democratic Process, Wm. and Mary Pol’y Rev.,
Vol. 2, No. 265, 2011 (calling for online disclosure of all written
information provided to legislators). Currently, the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, as amended by the Honest Leadership and
Open Government Act of 2007, only requires that lobbyists,
who are required to register, file disclosures of their financial
activity, their clients, their campaign contributions, and the
bills they lobbied on.
18See, e.g., Lee Drutman’s outstanding proposal for a new
online public forum for lobbyists, constituents, and other inter-
ested parties to publicly and transparently debate legislation
that would be managed by the Library of Congress and provide
congressional staff, journalists, and the public access to the best
available arguments, information, and ideas about public policy
in connection with the introduction of each piece of legislation.
A Better Way to Fix Lobbying, 40 Issues In Governance
Studies 1 ( June 2011) (published by the Brookings Institu-
tion).
19Unless otherwise provided, as used herein all references to
the Code or to a section of the Code refer to the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986, as amended. All references to the Regu-
lations or to the Treasury Regulations refer to Treasury
Regulations promulgated thereunder.
20 See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
22See, e.g., Timothy Lapira’s discussion of the literature, Is It
Who Says It, Or What They Say? Information Processing And
Lobbying Influence In Congress 4–8 (Dissertation, State Univ.
of N.J., Rutgers, 2008) (noting that ‘‘interest group research
has traditionally approached the subject of lobbying with the
assumption that groups indeed provide valuable information
to politicians, but has varied in its emphasis on the theoretical
nature and ultimate purpose of that information,’’ and distin-
guishing three categories of theories ‘‘exchange, framing, and
informational’’).
23We thank Craig Holman and Nick Allard for asking us to clar-
ify our position in this regard.
24We do not infer from Hall and Deardorff’s information sub-
sidy theory that all, or even a large part, of the information lob-
bying provides to Congress is a public good. We argue, instead,
that those who claim lobbying provides an informational public
good (which Hall and Deardorff themselves do not) must, upon
reflection, recognize that the current channels of information
transmission cannot support this claim. In other words, we
believe that, whatever position commentators take with respect
to the value of information provided through the lobbying pro-
cess, public information is better than information conveyed in
secret.
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Moreover, with regard to the tax subsidy, our
claim is not that the non-deductibility of lobbying
expenses deters big businesses from providing
substantive information to Congress or to the pub-
lic, but that allowing a deduction for such expen-
ditures could incentivize business taxpayers to
publicize information that is currently exchanged
behind closed doors in ways that are useful for
public deliberation and the legislative process.25
On the other hand, we do suggest that the changes
made to Section 162(e) in 1993, which deny a
deduction for all lobbying communications (as
such term is defined in the Code), may have
affected the ability of small businesses to lobby
Congress.
Additionally, we recognize that incentivizing
substantive disclosure will not solve all of the prob-
lems associated with lobbying and the legislative
process. For example, the control that lobbyists
can exert over legally unlimited election spending
by their large business clients in a post-Citizens
United era is, in many ways, far more troubling
than business lobbying expenditures in and of
themselves.26 The benefits of substantive lobbying
disclosure that we advocate may not make much
of a difference in curing distortions of the lobby-
ing process unless corporate political spending
is reigned in.27 Moreover, even if corporate (and
union) political spending is reigned in, the ‘‘gift
economy,’’ in which lawmakers provide privileged
access to those citizens, businesses, and their lob-
byists in exchange for contributions to legislators’
reelection campaigns, or for routinely paying for
expensive lunches and dinners, continues to ensure
that the system does not provide equal access to
all.28 We address these problems here only insofar
as we seek to distinguish between direct lobbying
expenditures and political spending—a distinction
that the 1993 amendments to Section 162(e) have
undercut.29
Furthermore, we acknowledge that lobbyists
do much more than provide information to Con-
gress. They keep clients informed about legis-
lative and regulatory developments, engage in
administrative lobbying, pursue grassroots lobby-
ing efforts, and much more.30 Our analysis is
restricted to direct lobbying of Congress, and only
one problem of the information exchange that takes
place.
Finally, we note that this article contributes to
a long and complicated debate regarding the cor-
rect mechanism to open up the process of informa-
tion sourcing by Congress, including proposals to
publish the reports created by the Congressional
Research Service (which are secret by default),31
calls for close to real-time publication of all infor-
mation about all bills at each stage in the legislative
process,32 and attempts to force legislators back
into their offices on Capitol Hill by eliminating
free lunches and other boondoggles that rendered
them inaccessible to those without the financial
25In other words, taking the deduction is voluntary, but requires
additional steps to comply with the transparency regulation.
Our proposal thus advances a change in the current ‘‘choice
architecture’’ that lumps legislative lobbying together with
grassroots lobbying and political spending from the perspective
of the taxpayer. Richard H. Thaler amd Cass R. Sunstein,
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness (2008).
26See Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Cam-
paign Finance Laws: Rolling Back Gains Made Under the Hon-
est Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 13 Elect.
L. J. 45–74 (2014) describing the damage the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens’ United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) to the gains made by the Honest Leader-
ship and Open Government Act of 2007; Tolchin and Tol-
chin, Pinstripe Patronage: Political Favoritism From
the Clubhouse to the White House and Beyond 89
(2010) (‘‘Lobbyists and members of Congress often become
tied to each other through relationships based on mutual favors.
These ties have become much stronger in recent years as elec-
tion ‘reform’ necessitates more and more fundraising interde-
pendence’’).
27The extent of involvement that some corporations have in
elections at the federal, state, and local level is described in
Town in Iowa Discovers There Is No Election Too Small For
Big Political Groups Seeking Influence, Washington Post




28See Lessig, supra note 5, at 142ff and 166ff (2012) (discus-
sing the literature); Clayton D. Peoples, Contributor Influence
in Congress: Social Ties and PAC Effects on U.S. House Poli-
cymaking, 51 Sociological Quart. 649 (2010).
29But we leave a full motivation of this distinction to a separate
article.
30See Allard, supra note 3, at 46.
31See, e.g., H.Res. 110: Congressional Research Service Elec-
tronic Accessibility Resolution of 2013 introduced by Rep.
Leonard Lance.
32GovTrack.us, run by Josh Tauberer, now scours many differ-
ent government websites to compile much more information
about bills and the legislative process than the Library of Con-
gress’s Thomas system provides. See, e.g., Joshua Tauberer,
Case Study: GovTrack.us in Timothy O’Reilly, Et. Al.,
Open Government 201 (2010).
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resources to participate in the pay-to-play process.33
We believe, however, that our article breaks new
ground by (1) recognizing that lobbying information
does not provide a public good unless published, and
(2) introducing a mechanism to promote transparency
in the legislative process by incentivizing lobbyists to
disclose publicly information that legislators have
consistently used (though not revealed) in making
legislative decisions.
Part II describes the current tax treatment for lob-
bying expenses, specifically Section 162(e), which
denies a deduction of direct lobbying expenses.
Part III describes the evolution of Section 162(e),
which has morphed, over time, from the position
under common law that no lobbying expenses
should be deductible, to the version in effect from
1963 until 1993 that allowed a deduction for certain
direct lobbying expenses, to the revised version
enacted in 1993 that scaled back the deductibility
of these expenditures. Part IV critically examines
the arguments that support the current version of
Section 162(e) from a tax perspective. Part V con-
siders the claim that lobbying provides an informa-
tional public good in greater detail and specifies
how generally recognized information asymmetries
and strategic uses of lobbying information detract
from the legislative process. Part VI explores our
proposal in greater depth. The article concludes
with Part VII.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE TAX
PROVISION
Section 162(a) provides taxpayers (including large
corporations) with a deduction for ‘‘ordinary and
necessary’’ expenses paid or incurred in carrying
on a trade or business. In other words, a business
is entitled to reduce its revenue by the expenses it
incurs to generate that revenue in determining tax-
able income. Lobbying and political expenditures,
however, currently are not deductible. Section
162(e)(1) provides, in full:
(e) Denial of deduction for certain lobbying
and political expenditures
(1) In general
No deduction shall be allowed under subsec-
tion (a) for any amount paid or incurred in
connection with—
(A) influencing legislation,
(B) participation in, or intervention in, any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposi-
tion to) any candidate for public office,
(C) any attempt to influence the general pub-
lic, or segments thereof, with respect to elec-
tions, legislative matters, or referendums, or
(D) any direct communication with a covered
executive branch official in an attempt to
influence the official actions or positions of
such official.
We emphasize that, in this article, we only pro-
pose an amendment to Section 162(e)(1)(A), regard-
ing the denial of a deduction for ‘‘influencing
legislation,’’ but do not consider any of the other dis-
allowances.
A. Scope
There is no single definition in the law for the
term ‘‘lobbying.’’34 For purposes of disallowing a
business expense deduction, the term ‘‘lobbying’’
includes ‘‘influencing legislation,’’ which is defined
in the statute as ‘‘any attempt to influence legisla-
tion through communication with any member or
employee of a legislative body, or with any govern-
ment official or employee who may participate in
the formulation of legislation.’’35 Moreover, any
amounts paid or incurred for research for, or prep-
aration, planning, or coordination of, any of these
activities is treated as a lobbying activity, and also
is disallowed as a deduction.36 The regulations pro-
vide that influencing legislation means: (A) any
attempt to influence any legislation through a
lobbying communication, and (B) all activities, such
33The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110–81, 121 Stat. 735, enacted September 14,
2007, prohibited gifts, free lunches, transportation, and other
benefits conferred on legislators in Congress by lobbyists. Hol-
man, see supra note 26.
34See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This ‘‘Lobbying’’ That We
Are All So Worried About?, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 485,
487–488 (2008).
35I.R.C. x 162(e)(4)(A). For these purposes, the term ‘‘legisla-
tion’’ includes action with respect to Acts, bills, resolutions,
or similar items by the Congress, any State legislature, any
local council, or similar governing body, or by the public in a
referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar
procedure. I.R.C. x 4911(e)(2).
36I.R.C. x 162(e)(5)(C). In addition, Section 162(e) denies a
deduction for the portion of dues or similar amounts paid by
a taxpayer to a tax-exempt organization that is allocable to
the expenditures set forth in Section 162(e)(1). I.R.C.
x 162(e)(3).
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as research, preparation, planning and coordina-
tion, including deciding whether to make a lobbying
communication, engaged in for the purpose of mak-
ing or supporting a lobbying communication, even
if it is not made.37 The regulations provide that an
attempt to influence any legislation through a lob-
bying communication is making a lobbying com-
munication.38
For these purposes, a ‘‘lobbying communica-
tion’’ is a communication (other than any commu-
nication compelled by subpoena, or otherwise
compelled by federal or state law) with any mem-
ber or employee of a legislative body or any other
government official or employee, who may partic-
ipate in the formulation of the legislation, that does
either of the following: (A) the communication
refers to specific legislation and reflects a view
on that legislation; or (B) the communication clari-
fies, amplifies, modifies, or provides support for
views reflected in a prior lobbying communica-
tion.39 Specific legislation includes both pending
legislation and legislation that has not yet been
introduced.40
The language of the regulations is critical in
that it takes into account communications that
reflect the writer’s view on legislation in addition
to communications that either expressly support or
oppose that legislation. According to the pream-
ble to the regulations, several commentators sug-
gested that the regulations should distinguish
between influencing legislation and educating
legislators. In addition, some commentators sug-
gested that presenting a balanced analysis of the
merits and defects of specific legislation should
not constitute reflecting a view on legislation.
However, neither recommendation was adopted
in the final regulations.41
By broadly defining the term ‘‘influencing legis-
lation,’’ Treasury Regulations promulgated under
Section 162(e) disallow a deduction for much of
the industry information that might serve a public
good. The following examples, extracted from
these regulations, illustrate the scope of such
term:
Example 8. (i) Taxpayer Y represents citrus
fruit growers. Y writes a letter to a United
States senator discussing how pesticide O has
benefited citrus fruit growers and disputing
problems linked to its use. The letter discusses
a bill pending in Congress and states in part:
This bill would prohibit the use of pesti-
cide O. If citrus growers are unable to use
this pesticide, their crop yields will be
severely reduced, leading to higher pri-
ces for consumers and lower profits,
even bankruptcy, for growers.
(ii) Y’s views on the bill are reflected in this
statement. Thus, the communication is a lob-
bying communication, and Y is influencing
legislation.42
Example 9. (i) B, the president of Taxpayer Z,
an insurance company, meets with Q, who
chairs the X state legislature’s committee with
jurisdiction over laws regulating insurance
companies, to discuss the possibility of legisla-
tion to address current problems with surplus-
line companies. B recommends that legislation
be introduced that would create minimum cap-
ital and surplus requirements for surplus-line
companies and create clearer guidelines con-
cerning the risks that surplus-line companies
can insure. B’s discussion with Q is a lobbying
communication because B refers to and reflects
a view on a specific legislative proposal. There-
fore, Z is influencing legislation.
(ii) Q is not convinced that the market for sur-
plus-line companies is substantial enough to
warrant such legislation and requests that B
provide information on the amount and types
of risks covered by surplus-line companies.
37Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(1) (as amended in 1995).
38Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(2) (as amended in 1995).
39Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(3) (as amended in 1995).
40Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(5) (as amended in 1995). The reg-
ulations provide an example in which a taxpayer prepares a
paper asserting that a lack of new capital is hurting the national
economy. The paper indicates that lowering the capital gains
rate would increase the availability of capital and increase tax
receipts from the capital gains tax. The taxpayer forwards the
paper to representatives in Congress with a cover letter that,
in part, urges that those representatives support a reduction in
the capital gains tax rate. This communication is a lobbying
communication because it refers to and reflects a view on a spe-
cific legislative proposal (i.e., lowering the capital gains rate).
The example concludes that the taxpayer is influencing legisla-
tion even though there is no indication that Congress previously
had been considering any proposal with respect to the capital
gains rate. See Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in
1995), Ex. 5.
41T.D. 8602, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,568 ( July 21, 1995).
42Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in 1995), Ex. 8. The
conclusion of this example is that Y’s expenses in preparing the
communication would not be deductible for tax purposes.
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After the meeting, B has employees of Z pre-
pare estimates of the percentage of property
and casualty insurance risks handled by sur-
plus-line companies. B sends the estimates
with a cover letter that simply refers to the
enclosed materials. Although B’s follow-up
letter to Q does not refer to specific legislation
or reflect a view on such legislation, B’s letter
supports the views reflected in the earlier com-
munication. Therefore, the letter is a lobby-
ing communication and Z is influencing
legislation.43
In both cases, one can certainly see the benefit to
the taxpayer that could result from the success of
its own lobbying efforts. But there is also a public
benefit to such information provided by the busi-
ness taxpayer. Knowledge of markets, business
conditions, and the effects of government action
on thousands of different industries across the
country (with customers and production facilities
around the globe) are essential to the intelligent
regulation of markets.44 Those who believe in mar-
ket regulation should be particularly concerned
that legislators have ready access to such indepen-
dent information for purposes of legislation and
oversight.45
We acknowledge that information produced by
the type of lobbying described in Examples 8 and
9, above, may be self-serving. But this suggests all
the more that routine publication should be encour-
aged. Legislators presently already rely on information
provided by lobbyists. By bringing this information
to light, state and local governments, the press,
sophisticated intermediaries, and the public—who
may be on the other side of an issue—are empowered
to participate in fact-checking, interpreting, and coun-
terbalancing one-sided information. Moreover, by
publishing lobbying communications, the judgment
as to how some piece of information communicated
privately to a committee chair or staffer should be
interpreted, or whether it should become part of the
debate at all, is not left to the judgment of individual
legislators themselves. 46
B. Justification
The non-deductibility provisions of Section
162(e) have been justified on a number of grounds.
First, lobbying expenditures are not sufficiently
related to a business’s survival and profitability to
fall within the ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ require-
ment of Section 162.47 Second, in an attempt to
achieve ‘‘tax neutrality’’48 with respect to lobbying
and political expenditures, business taxpayers
should not be entitled to a tax benefit (i.e. the deduc-
tion) not available to non-business taxpayers.49
Finally, non-deductibility reflects a public policy
43Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in 1995), Ex. 9. Again,
the conclusion of this example is that Z’s expenses in preparing
the communication would not be deductible for tax purposes.
44See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in
Paradigm in Economics in Selected Works Of Joseph Sti-
glitz, Vol. I 53, 62ff (2009) (criticizing the standard, compet-
itive, general equilibrium approach to market failure, because it
did not account ‘‘for the myriad information problems faced by
consumers and firms every day.’’).
45By ‘‘independent’’ we here mean independent of the execu-
tive and administrative agencies. As the ABATaskforce on Fed-
eral Lobbying Laws notes, ‘‘[t]he government—whether it be
the executive or the legislative branch—simply cannot know
the intricate details of the myriad aspects of national life that
its actions might affect unless it has access to the expert contri-
butions of the persons and interests involved.’’ Lobbying Law in
the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements, avail-
able at < http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/administrative_law/lobbying_task_force_report_
010311.authcheckdam.pdf > .
46While committee chairs, committee staff, and policy experts
among legislators may have access to information on both
sides of an issue, other legislators, not as well versed in that pol-
icy area, may only see information that is publicly disclosed in a
timely fashion. By incentivizing the release of additional public
information, these legislators may become more informed
about more issues upon which they cast votes. See notes 139–
144 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser,
Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution
Works, and How It Doesn’t (2013) (describing how impor-
tant decisions on mark-up were sometimes conducted by com-
mittee staff without input by legislators).
47See, infra, Part III. See also Comment, Deducting Business
Expenses Designed to Influence Governmental Policy as
‘‘Ordinary and Necessary’’: Cammarano v. United States and
a Bit Beyond, 69 Yale L.J. 1017, 1028 (1960).
48One commentator expressed the view that the ‘‘no subsidy of
lobbying’’ rationale might express one of three different con-
cerns of tax neutrality: (1) the government should not be both
an encourager and recipient of lobbying (judicial neutrality),
(2) these lobbying deductions are discriminatory because they
are worth more to wealthier taxpayers (wealth neutrality), and
(3) all taxpayers, especially those who cannot obtain lobbying
deductions, should be treated equally (deduction neutrality).
See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Tax Policy, Social Policy, and
Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 61 Tax Notes 595, 604
(Nov. 1, 1993).
49Cammarano v. U.S., 353 U.S. 498 (1959).
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concern embodied in many state laws prohibiting
corporate spending for political purposes.50 Tax
consequences, it is urged, must not frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing partic-
ular types of conduct.51
As we discuss in Part IV, each of these arguments
is problematic—either from a pure tax standpoint,
or from a larger public policy standpoint.
C. The local exception
Section 162(e) also contains a surprising excep-
tion. While lobbying at the federal and state legisla-
tive levels are non-deductible, Section 162(e)(2)
makes an exception ‘‘in the case of any legislation
of any local council or similar governing body.’’
For local government lobbying, the relevant provi-
sion does allow the deduction of:
all ordinary and necessary expenses (includ-
ing, but not limited to, traveling expenses
described in subsection (a)(2) and the cost of
preparing testimony) paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business—
(i) in direct connection with appearances
before, submission of statements to, or send-
ing communications to the committees, or
individual members, of such council or body
with respect to legislation or proposed legisla-
tion of direct interest to the taxpayer, or
(ii) in direct connection with communication of
information between the taxpayer and an orga-
nization of which the taxpayer is a member
with respect to any such legislation or proposed
legislation which is of direct interest to the tax-
payer and to such organization.52
In other words, ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in connection with direct (not grass roots)
local legislative communications, or communica-
tions regarding local legislative matters between a
taxpayer and a trade association of which the tax-
payer is a member, are deductible.53
This exception is truly puzzling. Indeed, leaving
aside that this deduction is available to small busi-
nesses as well—the ‘‘local exception’’ could look
like a federal subsidy to large corporations for influ-
encing local legislation—if you accept the argu-
ment that a tax deduction constitutes a ‘‘subsidy.’’54
Multi-national corporations can already bring
overwhelming lobbying resources to bear against
resistance to their plans at the local legislative
level. Moreover, their bargaining position for tax
deductions with municipalities is already lopsided,
in that municipalities cannot afford to lose jobs
and must attract new industry. If anything, the
Code should not further encourage outside influ-
ence at the local level by big business.
So what explains the disallowance under Section
162(e)(1)(A) and the ‘‘local exception’’ under Sec-
tion 162(e)(2)? As we shall see, the local exception
is primarily a survival from the original 1963 statute
that, for the first time, explicitly allowed for the
deductibility of direct lobbying expenses at all lev-
els of government.
III. PATH DEPENDENCE, POLITICS,
AND POLICY
The history of Section 162(e) represents a frac-
tious debate on the issue, and several policy
changes, with a persistent bias against allowing
businesses to expense their lobbying costs.
50With the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens’ United, this
picture has become slightly more complicated. We acknowl-
edge that, by allowing businesses to deduct expenditures for
certain lobbying expenses, there is the possibility that busi-
nesses will have a greater incentive to devote resources towards
lobbying. However, there is no evidence that the reforms to Sec-
tion 162(e) that disallowed a deduction for all lobbying expen-
ditures had any effect in reducing the amount spent by business
on lobbying activities. Conversely, we do not believe that allow-
ing a deduction for lobbying activities will increase the extent
that businesses lobby their positions. Instead, we argue that,
on the question of deductibility, the issue of salience arises in
the types of lobbying activities conducted. We believe that
there is a low degree of correlation between the amount of lob-
bying and the availability of a tax deduction for lobbying.
Rather, we believe that allowing a business expense deduction
for certain types of lobbying, while continuing to disallow a
deduction for other types of lobbying, will incentivize those
businesses active in the lobbying process to change their behav-
ior by disclosing information previously provided to legislators
(and used in making voting decisions) in camera because of the
added tax benefits.
51Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (legal
expenses incurred in resisting issuance by Postmaster General
of fraud order accorded deductibility). See Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959); Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1958); Lilly v. Com-
missioner, 343 U.S. 90, 94–97 (1952).
52I.R.C. x 162(e)(2).
53I.R.C. x 162(e).
54See, generally, Theodore Seto, Keeping Tax-Subsidized Cor-
porate Money Out Of Politics, 127 Tax Notes 1476 ( June 28,
2010).
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A. The U.S. Treasury’s disallowance and the
interpretation of the judiciary: Pre-1963 views
of the deduction for lobbying expenditures
Prior to 1962, the general rule was that expenses
to influence legislation were not deductible. Jasper
Cummings has argued that disallowance was the
result of long-standing judicial disfavor of certain
types of lobbying activities.55 Thus, in Trist v.
Child (1874), the Supreme Court refused to enforce
a contract for payment for lobbying services on
grounds that the contract violated public policy.56
The Supreme Court’s language reflects the pro-
found distaste with which much of the federal judi-
ciary has regarded lobbying throughout most of
modern American history. The Trist Court stated:
The agreement in the present case was for the
sale of the influence and exertions of the lobby
agent to bring about the passage of a law for
the payment of a private claim, without refer-
ence to its merits, by means which, if not cor-
rupt, were illegitimate, and considered in
connection with the pecuniary interest of the
agent at stake, contrary to the plainest princi-
ples of public policy. No one has a right, in
such circumstances, to put himself in a posi-
tion of temptation to do what is regarded as
so pernicious in its character. The law forbids
the inchoate step, and puts the seal of its rep-
robation upon the undertaking.
If any of the great corporations of the country
were to hire adventurers who make market of
themselves in this way, to procure the passage
of a general law with a view to the promo-
tion of their private interests, the moral sense
of every right-minded man would instinc-
tively denounce the employer and employed
as steeped in corruption, and the employment
as infamous.57
For federal income tax purposes, non-deductibility
of lobbying expenses began early in the process.
The corporate income tax was enacted in 1909,
the individual income tax in 1913, and, by, 1915,
the Treasury Department had issued an administra-
tive ruling concluding that lobbying expenditures
‘‘are held not to be ordinary and necessary expenses
55See Cummings, supra note 48, at 605–607.
5688U.S. 441 (1874).
57Id. at 451–452. The Court continued:
If the instances were numerous, open, and tolerated,
they would be regarded as measuring the decay of the
public morals and the degeneracy of the times. No
prophetic spirit would be needed to foretell the conse-
quences near at hand. The same thing in lesser legisla-
tion, if not so prolific of alarming evils, is not less
vicious in itself, nor less to be condemned. The vital
principle of both is the same. The evils of the latter
are of sufficient magnitude to invite the most serious
consideration. The prohibition of the law rests upon a
solid foundation. A private bill is apt to attract little
attention. It involves no great public interest, and usu-
ally fails to excite much discussion. Not unfrequently
the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to
investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of
the measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful,
and conceals nothing, all is well. If he uses nefarious
means with success, the spring-head and the stream of
legislation are polluted. To legalize the traffic of such
service, would open a door at which fraud and false-
hood would not fail to enter and make themselves felt
at every accessible point. It would invite their presence
and offer them a premium. If the tempted agent be cor-
rupt himself, and disposed to corrupt others, the transi-
tion requires but a single step. He has the means in his
hands, with every facility and a strong incentive to use
them. The widespread suspicion which prevails, and
charges openly made and hardly denied, lead to the con-
clusion that such events are not of rare occurrence.
Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the
hope of a reward contingent upon success, and to be
graduated by a percentage upon the amount appropri-
ated, the danger of tampering in its worst form is greatly
increased.
It is by reason of these things that the law is as it is
upon the subject. It will not allow either party to be
led into temptation where the thing to be guarded
against is so deleterious to private morals and so injuri-
ous to the public welfare. In expressing these views, we
follow the lead of reason and authority.
We are aware of no case in English or American juris-
prudence like the one here under consideration, where the
agreement has not been adjudged to be illegal and void.
We have said that for professional services in this connec-
tion a just compensation, may be recovered. But where
they are blended and confused with those which are for-
bidden, the whole is a unit and indivisible. That which is
bad destroys that which is good, and they perish together.
Services of the latter character, gratuitously rendered, are
not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the foun-
dation of the sanction. The tendency to mischief, if not
wanting, is greatly lessened. The taint lies in the stipula-
tion for pay. Where that exists, it affects fatally, in all its
parts, the entire body of the contract. In all such cases, pro-
tior conditio defendentis. Where there is turpitude, the law
will help neither party.
Id. at 451–452.
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in the operation and maintenance of the business of
a corporation and are therefore not deductible.’’58 In
1918, also relying on the ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’
requirement to the predecessor to Section 162, the
Treasury Department enacted a regulation denying
a deduction for lobbying expenditures.59
Even as Treasury denied a deduction for lobbying
activities, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Board of
Tax Appeals (i.e., the predecessor to the Tax Court),
nonetheless, frequently allowed taxpayers to deduct
the costs of lobbying on a case-by-case basis. The
Board has been described as a ‘‘formidable foe’’
to the Treasury’s policy during this period.60
According to Professor Sharp, ‘‘[t]o avoid the oblig-
atory application of the regulation, that tribunal
chose a singular approach. The Board considered
the facts in each particular case and reached its con-
clusion solely by determining whether or not the
expenditures were in fact ordinary and necessary.’’61
The Supreme Court first considered the Treasury
Regulations in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner (1941).62 That case involved a tax-
payer who represented German textile interests in
an effort to obtain legislation regarding properties
seized during World War I.63 The taxpayer deducted
expenses incurred in lobbying Congress to pass
such legislation. The government, on audit, denied
these deductions. In the absence of a statutory pro-
vision explicitly governing the deductibility of lob-
bying expenditures, the Court’s decision hinged on
Treasury’s interpretation of the phrase ‘‘ordinary
and necessary’’ business expenses. The taxpayer
challenged Treasury’s interpretation, maintaining
that his lobbying expenses were, in fact, ‘‘ordinary
and necessary.’’ In an opinion authored by Justice
Douglas—whose expertise in corporate finance
and administrative law was beyond challenge64—
the Court upheld the Treasury Department’s regu-
lations by construing Congress’s delegation of
powers broadly, stating that ‘‘[t]he words ‘ordinary
and necessary’ are not so clear and unambiguous in
their meaning and application as to leave no room
for an interpretative regulation.’’65 The Court found
that the Treasury Department had not ‘‘usurped the
legislative function by carving out this special
group of expenses and making them non-deduct-
ible.’’ Moreover, the Court reasoned, ‘‘[s]uch a
course did not contravene any Congressional policy.
58See T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 57, 57–58 (1915).
59Treas. Reg. x 33, art. 143 (1918), reprinted in 132 Internal
Revenue Acts of the United States, 1909–1950: Legis-
lative Histories, Laws, and Administrative Docu-
ments 75 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). The
regulation, promulgated under the charitable contributable
deduction provisions, provided that: ‘‘Corporations are not
entitled to deduct from gross income contributions or gifts
which individuals may deduct under section 23(n). Donations
made by a corporation for purposes connected with the oper-
ation of its business, however, when limited to charitable
institutions, hospitals, or educational institutions conducted
for the benefit of its employees or their dependents are a
proper deduction as ordinary and necessary expenses. Dona-
tions which legitimately represent a consideration for a bene-
fit flowing directly to the corporation as an incident of its
business are allowable deductions from gross income.Sums
of money expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or
defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda, includ-
ing advertising other than trade advertising, and contribu-
tions for campaign expenses, are not deductible from gross
income (emphasis added).’’
60See generally Dean E. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance
of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.
L. Rev. 365, 367–8 (1959).
61Id. at 367–368, n. 15 and 16. The Board of Tax Appeals
first reversal came in the Ninth Circuit with Sunset Scav-
enger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936),
rev’g. 31 B.T.A. 758 (1934). In that case, the court con-
cluded that the term ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ as used in
the statute was sufficiently ambiguous and that, because
Congress had re-enacted the statute with the knowledge of
the regulation [denying a deduction for lobbying expenses],
such re-enactment was an implicit blessing that ‘‘the regula-
tion was not inconsistent with the intent of the statute.’’ Id.,
citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
288U.S. 269, 273, 53 S.Ct. 337, 339, 77 L.Ed. 739. The
Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view
and continued to deny the obligatory application of the reg-
ulations. See Sharp at 368, n. 22, citing William P. Kyne, 35
B.T.A. 202 (1936); Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B.T.A. 578 (1936); H.
R. Cullen, 41 B.T.A. 1054 (1940).
62314U.S. 327 (1941).
63In this case, the taxpayer’s compensation for these services
was contingent, and the taxpayer bore all of its own expenses
including the costs of lobbying (within the meaning of the reg-
ulations) on behalf of its clients. In its decision, the Court
addressed two arguments by the taxpayer. First, that the regula-
tions were inapplicable to deny a business expense for lobbying
expenditures because the regulations were incorporated into the
charitable deduction section for individuals rather than the busi-
ness expense deduction provisions. The Court held that, based
on the history of the regulations, the fact that such regulations
were not incorporated under the correct provision was ‘‘frivo-
lous.’’ Id. at 338. The Court also held that the taxpayer’s second
argument, that the regulations were invalid, also lacked sub-
stance. Id.
64Douglas was drafted by Roosevelt to build the new Securities
Exchange Commission in the 1930s.
65Id.
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Contracts to spread such insidious influences through
legislative halls have long been condemned.’’66
In 1959, the Supreme Court upheld essentially
the same Treasury regulation in Cammarano v.
U.S.67 In Cammarano, the taxpayers68 deducted
amounts paid to trade associations for grassroots
lobbying to defeat proposed state ballot initiative
measures [in Washington State and Arkansas]
which would have changed the manner in which
alcohol was sold in their states, significantly affect-
ing the taxpayers’ businesses. The Court saw no
merit in limiting the holding in Textile Mills to
direct dealings with legislators, finding that the def-
inition of lobbying includes ‘‘publicity directed to
the general public on legislative matters.’’69 The
Court stated ‘‘[w]e think that initiatives are plainly
‘legislation’ within the meaning of these Regula-
tions. Had the measures involved in these cases
been passed by the people of Washington and
Arkansas they would have had the effect and status
of ordinary laws in every respect. The Constitutions
of the States of Washington and Arkansas both
explicitly recognize that in providing for initiatives
they are vesting legislative power in the people.’’ 70
The Court again addressed the validity of the
Treasury Regulations. The taxpayers argued that
their expenditures were necessary to preserve their
businesses, such amounts should be deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under
the Code as a matter of law, and a regulation pur-
porting to deny deductibility to such expenditures
is plainly contrary to the statute and ipso facto inval-
id.71 In affirming its holding in Textile Mills. The
court further limited its holding in Heininger,
which allowed a deduction for expenditures without
which a business enterprise would inevitably suffer
66Id. Interestingly, Textile Mills was decided on December 8,
1941—the day after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, signi-
fying the point at which the United States entered World War II.
It is hard to believe that the decision could have been decided
any other way in light of the historical events affecting the
nation at this time.
Textile Mills was later cited by the Supreme Court in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356U.S. 30 (1958), for
the proposition that a deduction may be denied under Section
162 where such deduction would frustrate public policy. Tank
Truck Rentals was the basis for Congress’ later enactment of
Sections 162(c), (f), and (g). The legislative history to those
provisions state:
From the standpoint of tax policy, there generally has
been a reluctance to deny business expenses on the
ground that this departs from the concept of a tax
imposed on actual net business income.’’ There still
remains, however, the question as to what is an ordinary
and necessary business expense. The Supreme Court in
the Tank Truck Rental case, for example, in holding
that the payment of fines could not be considered as ordi-
nary and necessary, stated:
A finding of ‘necessity’ cannot be made however,
if allowance of the deduction would frustrate
sharply defined national or State policies proscrib-
ing the particular types of conduct evidenced by
some governmental declaration thereof.
On the same grounds, it appears appropriate to deny deduc-
tions for bribes, illegal kickbacks, and the penalty portion
of antitrust treble damage payments. A 1958 amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code already suggests such a con-
gressional policy. Under that amendment no deduction
may be taken for payments to officials or employees of a
foreign government if in the United States such payments
would be unlawful. In addition, deduction of expenditures
made to influence legislation are already limited by a spe-
cific provision (sec. 162(e)) added by the Revenue Act of
1962.
Explanation of provision—The Provision added by the
committee amendments denies deductions of four types
of expenditures: fines or similar penalties paid to a govern-
ment for the violation of any law, a portion of treble dam-
age payments under the antitrust laws following a related
criminal conviction (or plea of equity or nolo contendere),
deductions for bribes paid to public officials (whether or
not foreign officials), and other unlawful bribes or ‘kick-
backs.’ The provision for the denial of the deduction for
payments in these situations which are deemed to violate
public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy,
in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly
defined to justify the disallowance of deductions. However,
this is not, of course, intended to affect the treatment of
lobbying expenditures which are already covered by the
tax law.
S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969), 1969-3
C.B. 423, 596–597.
67Cammarano v. U.S., 358U.S. 498 (1959).
68Although jointly decided, this decision reflects two cases
brought to the Court presenting identical issues for appeal:
Cammarano v. U.S., 246F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957) and F. Strauss
& Son, Inc., of Arkansas v. Commissioner, 251F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1958).
69Id. at 505, citing e.g., Revere Racing Ass’n v. Scanlon,
232F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1956); American Hardware & Equipment
Co. v. Commissioner, 202F.2d 126 (4th. Cir. 1953); Roberts
Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195F.2d 948 (8th. Cir. 1952); Sun-
set Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84F.2d 453 (9th. Cir 1936).
70Id. at 505–06.
71Id. at 507. The taxpayers relied on Commissioner v. Hei-
ninger, 320U.S. 467 (1943), in which the Court held that a den-
tist could deduct (as ordinary and necessary business expenses)
the cost of attorney’s fees paid to defend himself against mail
fraud charges that would have ended his business.
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adverse effects in situations where granting such
deduction would frustrate no ‘‘sharply defined na-
tional or state policies.’’72 However, in the case
of the grassroots lobbying expenditures at issue in
Cammarano, the Court noted that ‘‘[h]ere the deduc-
tions sought are prohibited by Regulations which
themselves constitute an expression of a sharply
defined national policy, further demonstration of
which may be found in other sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.’’73
The Court then cited to the history on the regu-
lations, the large body of case law, and the
changes made to the Internal Revenue Code in
the intervening years. Based on the fact that
Congress re-enacted, without change, the term
‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ in the 1954 Code, the
Court concluded ‘‘[u]nder these circumstances
we think that the Regulations have acquired the
force of law.’’74
Finally, turning to the issue of tax neutrality,
the Court, citing Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in
Slee75 and amendments to the Code limiting the
ability of tax-exempt organizations to engage in
political or lobbying activities, attempted to illus-
trate that by denying the deduction at issue, all tax-
payers must be treated equally with respect to these
expenditures. ‘‘Controversies of that sort must be
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury
stands aside from them.’’76 In other words, the
Court was refusing to allow the fisc to subsidize lob-
bying expenditures and to require their payment
with after-tax dollars.
In its opinion, the Court appears to combine this
with Cammarano’s argument that the limitation of a
tax deduction is the equivalent of a limitation of
their First Amendment rights.77 The Court rejected
this argument stating:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduc-
tion because they engage in constitutionally
protected activities, but are simply being
required to pay for those activities entirely
out of their own pockets, as everyone else
engaging in similar activities is required to
do under the provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. Nondiscriminatory denial of deduc-
tion from gross income to sums expended
to promote or defeat legislation is plainly
not ‘‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.’’. Rather, it appears to us to express a
determination by Congress that since pur-
chased publicity can influence the fate of
legislation which will affect, directly or indi-
rectly, all in the community, everyone in the
community should stand on the same footing
as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury
of the United States is concerned.78
Following Cammarano, the Treasury Department
promulgated regulations that expanded the types of
72Id. at 508.
73Id. In addition, citing to the re-enactment rule relied upon
by the Court in Textile Mills, the Court in Cammarano stated
that:
As was said in Textile Mills, ‘the words ‘ordinary and
necessary’ are not so clear and unambiguous in their
meaning and application as to leave no room for an inter-
pretative regulation. The numerous cases which have
come to this Court on that issue bear witness to that.’
In the present cases there is before us regulatory lan-
guage of more than 40 years’ continuous duration
expressly providing that sums expended for the activities
here involved shall not be considered an ordinary and
necessary business expense under the statute. The provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code which underlie the
Regulations have been repeatedly re-enacted by the Con-
gress without the slightest suggestion that the policy
expressed in these regulatory measures does other than
precisely conform to its intent.
Id. at 508–09.
74Id. at 510–11.
75Slee v. Commissioner, 42F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
76Id. at 185.
77Cammarano at 512.
78Id. at 513. As discussed, infra, in Part IV, it is not clear that
denial of a tax deduction achieves tax neutrality as the Court in
Cammarano suggests. Because many of the benefits received
by non-business taxpayers from lobbying are not subject to tax,
the fact that their lobbying expenditures are non-deductible
achieves a certain parity. Charitable organizations receive public
subsidies through tax-deductible contributions, and may influ-
ence legislation—the provisions of the Code that prevent these
organizations from participating in the political process only
penalize these organizations when a substantial part of the total
activities of the organization are for the purpose of influencing
legislation. In other words, incidental (or non-substantial) activ-
ities are subsidized. Business taxpayers, however, are taxed on
their income, but are prohibited from deducting the lobbying
expenditures required to produce that income. This mismatching
of income and expense can be seen as placing business taxpayers
on a lower footing than non-business taxpayers.
But, see Supplemental and Minority Views of Senators Paul
Douglas and Albert Gore, 1962-3 C.B. 1092, 1116–1120.
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expenditures disallowed as deductions—including
expenditures for both direct and grassroots lob-
bying, and the disallowance of a deduction for a
portion of dues paid to a membership organiza-
tion, a substantial part of the activities of which con-
sisted of lobbying.79 The regulations issued by the
Treasury Department in 1959 raised many adminis-
trative and enforcement problems and uncertainties
for both the government and taxpayers.80 More
importantly, however, Congress became concerned
with the apparent incongruity between the treatment
of expenses for appearances before the different
branches of government.81 For example, expenses
incurred in appearing before legislative bodies or
before legislators were not deductible while appear-
ances before executive or administrative officials
with respect to administrative matters, or before the
courts with respect to judicial matters, were deduct-
ible where the expenses otherwise qualify as trade or
business expenses.
B. The enactment of Section 162(e) in 1963:
Congress steps in
As part of the Revenue Act of 1962,82 Congress
addressed these issues for the first time by enacting
Section 162(e), which provided for a deduction for
expenses associated with direct lobbying activities
incurred by business taxpayers.83
Section 162(e), as enacted in 1963, provided
that a taxpayer could deduct all of its ordinary and
necessary direct lobbying expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness.84 Specifically, Section 162(e) defined these
79T.D. 6435, 1960-1 C.B. 79, promulgated former Treas. Reg. x
1.162-15(c)(15), which provided:
x 1.162-15 Excepted Contributions. * * * (c) (1) Expen-
ditures for lobbying purposes, for the promotion or
defeat of legislation, for political campaign purposes (in-
cluding the support of or opposition to any candidate for
public office), or for carrying on propaganda (including
advertising) related to any of the foregoing purposes
are not deductible from gross income. For example, the
cost of advertising to promote or defeat legislation or
to influence the public with respect to the desirability
or undesirability of proposed legislation is not deductible
as a business expense, even though the legislation may
directly affect the taxpayer’s business. On the other
hand, expenditures for institutional or ‘‘good will’’ adver-
tising which keeps the taxpayer’s name before the public
are generally deductible as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses provided the expenditures are related to
the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in
the future. For example, a deduction will ordinarily be
allowed for the cost of advertising which keeps the tax-
payer’s name before the public in connection with
encouraging contributions to such organizations as the
Red Cross, the purchase of United States Savings
Bonds, or participation in similar causes. In like fashion,
expenditures for advertising which present views on eco-
nomic, financial, social, or other subjects of a general
nature but which do not involve any of the activities spec-
ified in the first sentence of this subparagraph are deduct-
ible if they otherwise meet the requirements of the
regulations under section 162.
(2) Dues and other payments to an organization, such as a
labor union or a trade association, which otherwise meet
the requirements of the regulations under section 162,
are deductible in full unless a substantial part of the orga-
nization’s activities consists of one or more of those spec-
ified in the first sentence of subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph. If a substantial part of the activities of the orga-
nization consists of one or more of those so specified,
deduction will be allowed only for such portion of such
dues and other payments as the taxpayer can clearly estab-
lish is attributable to activities other than those so speci-
fied. The determination as to whether such specified
activities constitute a substantial part of an organization’s
activities shall be based on all the facts and circumstances.
In no event shall special assessments or similar payments
(including an increase in dues) made to any organization
for any of such specified purposes be deductible.
(3) Expenditures for the promotion or the defeat of legis-
lation include, but shall not be limited to, expenditures for
the purpose of attempting to—
(i) Influence members of a legislative body directly or
indirectly, by urging or encouraging the public to con-
tact such members for the purpose of proposing, sup-
porting, or opposing legislation, or
(ii) Influence the public to approve or reject a measure in
a referendum, initiative, vote on a constitutional
amendment, or similar procedure.
80H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprin-
ted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421. These problems included the dif-
ficulty in determining whether an expense is deductible in
general; how to isolate expenses related to legislative matters;
in segregating and classifying expenses; in detailed recordkeep-
ing related to such expenditures; and in determining whether
such expenses are substantial.
81H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprin-
ted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421; S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 703, 728.
82Pub. L. 87-834.
83
H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprin-
ted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421; S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 703, 728.
84I.R.C. x 162(e)(1)(A).
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direct lobbying expenditures as the taxpayer’s (1)
expenses in direct connection with appearances
before, submission of statements to, or sending
communications to, the committees, or individual
members, of federal, state, or local legislative bod-
ies with respect to legislation or proposed legisla-
tion of direct interest to the taxpayer, (2) expenses
in direct connection with communication of infor-
mation between the taxpayer and an organization
of which he is a member with respect to legislation
or proposed legislation of direct interest to the tax-
payer and to such organization. This language is, of
course, identical to the language of the local excep-
tion that previously appeared so puzzling.85
In addition, the portion of dues paid by a taxpayer
to any member organizations that were attributable to
the expenses of the above activities carried on by such
organization were considered to be deductible
expenses.86 However, deductions for participation or
intervention in political campaigns or in grassroots
lobbying continued to be nondeductible.87
The reasons for effectively overruling the Sup-
reme Court in Cammarano, voiding the Treasury
regulations, and overturning decades of past practice,
are recorded in the legislative history. The legislative
history cites the need for tax parity between expendi-
tures for appearances before the three branches of
government, and the desire to arrive at a true reflec-
tion of the taxpayer’s net income for tax purposes:88
It appears anomalous, for example, that expenses
incurred in appearing before legislative bodies or
before legislators are not deductible while
appearances before executive or administrative
officials with respect to administrative matters,
or before the courts with respect to judicial mat-
ters, are deductible where the expenses otherwise
qualify as trade or business expenses. Your com-
mittee believes that the present bar on deductions
with respect to legislative matters must be mod-
ified to place presentations to the legislative
branch of government on substantially the same
footing in this respect as that with the other two
coordinate branches of government.
Congress also emphasized the importance of the
information Congress obtained from those who
lobby legislators:
It also is desirable that taxpayers who have
information bearing on the impact of present
laws, or proposed legislation, on their trades
or businesses not be discouraged in making
this information available to the Members of
Congress or legislators at other levels of gov-
ernment. The presentation of such information
to the legislators is necessary to a proper eval-
uation on their part of the impact of present or
proposed legislation. The deduction of such
expenditures on the part of business also is nec-
essary to arrive at a true reflection of their real
income for tax purposes. In many cases making
sure that legislators are aware of the effect of
proposed legislation may be essential to the
very existence of a business.89
Congress denied the deduction for grassroots lob-
bying, presumably because such lobbying was direc-
ted at changing public opinion, but not at providing
information to legislators that legislatures needed
to assess legislation. Similarly, political spending—
from which corporations were still barred at the
time—was explicitly excluded as nondeductible.
The 1963 allowances would remain in place for
thirty years, until the tax treatment of lobbying
expenditures was swept up in the political debate
about campaign finance in the early 1990s. In
1991, Congress considered a bill which included
a proposal for the public financing of elections
through voluntary contributions and the elimination
of the tax deduction for lobbying expenditures that
was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.90
85There are several explanations for the local exception, which
we elaborate in the next section: (1) path-dependence, (2) the
fact that the disallowance was intended to raise taxes and
curb the influence of ‘‘big business’’ on the Congress; and (3)
the oft-cited legislative rationale that, at the local level, admin-
istrative lobbying activities—which are deductible and are not
disallowed by Section 162(e)—are not readily distinguishable
from legislative lobbying. See 30 Highlights and Documents
3648 (Sept. 22, 1993).
86I.R.C. x 162(e)(1)(B).
87I.R.C. x 162(e)(2)(A), (B).
88Id. The Treasury Department opposed Congress’ passage of
the allowance, arguing that it violated the principle of tax neu-
trality: ‘‘We are not against lobbying. We think lobbying is fine,
the more of it the better, because the representatives of the peo-
ple know what the country wants. We are only saying that the
Government should not pay for it.’’ Testimony of Secretary of
the Treasury C. Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,387 (1962).
89
H.R. Rep. No. 1447 at 17, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962); Sen.
Rep. No. 1881 at 22–23, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962).
90S. 102d Cong. x 405, 137 Cong. Rec. S6546 (daily ed. May
23, 1991).
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Then, as part of a larger effort at campaign finance
reform, President Bill Clinton, during the 1992
presidential campaign, promised to ‘‘eliminate the
deduction for special interest lobbying expenses.’’91
In his initial State of the Union address, on Febru-
ary 17, 1993, President Clinton reiterated that
promise:
I’m asking Congress to enact real campaign
finance reform. Let’s reduce the power of
special interests and increase the participa-
tion of the people. We should end the tax
deduction for special interest lobbying and
use the money to help clean up the political
system. And we should quickly enact legis-
lation to force lobbyists to disclose their
activities.92
Section 162(e) was amended shortly thereafter.
Notwithstanding President Clinton’s desire to
clean up the political process, the legislative his-
tory to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993
identifies increased revenues as the impetus for
repealing the deduction for direct lobbying busi-
ness expenses. The House Ways and Means
Committee report on the proposed amendment
to Section 162(e) explains that ‘‘[i]n the context
of deficit reduction legislation, it is appropriate
to limit the business deduction for lobbying
expenses.’’93
IV. ANALYSIS
In this Part, we examine the various arguments relat-
ing to the tax treatment of direct lobbying expenses.
A. The implicit tax subsidy argument
A persistent argument in the debate has been
that providing business taxpayers with a deduction
for lobbying expenses is the equivalent of provid-
ing those taxpayers with a tax subsidy for those
expenditures, and that the only way to provide
for governmental tax neutrality is to disallow any
deduction. This is the position currently taken by
Section 162(e). From a tax perspective, however,
this argument is unfounded, because a tax deduction
for lobbying expenses merely treats such business
expenses on par with other similar expenses of the
taxpayer.
As already noted, the Supreme Court in Cammar-
ano expressed concern that providing business tax-
payers with a deduction for lobbying expenditures
would provide them with a benefit not available to
non-business taxpayers.94
In the 1963 debates, which ultimately led to the
original provision allowing for the deductibility of
direct lobbying expenses, Senators Paul Douglas
and Albert Gore illustrated the ‘‘tax subsidy’’ argu-
ment as follows:
Suppose a measure is being considered, as
many have been, involving a proposed change
in the standards or testing procedures for food,
drugs, or cosmetics. The costs of presenting
the views of drug manufacturers and distributors
would be deductible. The cost of presentations
on behalf of consumers or of disinterested pro-
fessional or technical advisers would not be.
Or suppose that a State legislature is debating
a measure designed to decrease stream pollu-
tion. Manufacturers who would be adversely
affected by its enactment could deduct the
cost of opposition. Members of the public
interested in pure water for drinking or for
91
Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First: How
We Can All Change America 46 (1992).
92Id.
93
H.R. Rep. No. 103–111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 221, reprin-
ted in 1993-3 C.B. 167, 235 (1993). While most commentators
believe that Section 162(e) was amended primarily to address
budgetary concerns, the Treasury Department explains that
the tax neutrality rationale discussed in Cammarano was
also considered. According to Treasury, a deduction for lobby-
ing expenses ‘‘was inappropriate because it subsidized corpo-
rations and special interest groups which intervened in the
legislative process.’’ See Shannon King, The Lobbying Deduc-
tion Disallowance: Policy Considerations, Comparisons, and
Structuring Activities Under Amended Section 162(e), 15 Va.
Tax Rev. 551, 558 (1996), citing Department of the
Treasury, Summary of the Administration’s Revenue
Proposals 45 (Feb. 1993); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the
Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 379 (2011) at
n. 124; Jasper L. Cummings, Tax Policy, Social Policy, and
Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 93 Tax Notes 226-163
(Nov. 3 1993).
Professor Aprill notes that ‘‘Treasury did not explain how
the deduction was inappropriate.’’ Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 379 (2011) at
n. 124.
94Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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recreational uses would have to finance their
support of the measure entirely from their
own pockets. Or, at the local level, a business
owner of a piece of real estate could seek
advantageous amendment of the local zoning
ordinance, deducting the cost of his presenta-
tion before the local city council. The owners
of nearby residences would not receive this
help from the Federal Treasury in preparing
the exhibits and briefs necessary for effective
opposition.
These are discriminations impossible to jus-
tify.95
However, both the Court and the Senators failed
to take into account that business and nonbusiness
taxpayers are not equal in the following respect:
Whereas the benefits that accrue to business
taxpayers from their lobbying activities result,
where successful, in increased income that is sub-
ject to tax, nonbusiness taxpayers that achieve
their lobbying goals generally receive nontaxable
benefits. Symmetry results only where businesses
that receive taxable benefits from lobbying
receive offsetting tax deductions, while nonbusi-
ness taxpayers cannot deduct lobbying expendi-
tures where the benefits they receive are not
taxable.
Take, for example, the situation where solar
panel manufacturers lobby Congress to require
utilities to allow solar panel users to feed back
excess electricity generated by clean energy into
the local grid, and to credit those users for the
energy based on a set rate schedule. Solar panel
manufacturers support such legislation because
its passage would increase the sale of their prod-
uct and, accordingly, result in increased reve-
nues and profits. For those manufacturers, the
increased profits would be subject to tax. Busi-
nesses that purchase solar panels would also sup-
port such legislation because use of solar panels
would reduce their electricity costs. Again pas-
sage of the legislation would increase the taxable
profits of these businesses, which higher profits
would be subject to tax. In both cases, these busi-
nesses have increased their current expenses
(through lobbying expenditures) in order to gen-
erate future profits. Section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code generally allows a business tax-
payer the ability to offset this additional income
with the costs of earning that income. Lobbying
expenses should not be treated any differently.
However, under current law, Section 162(e)
denies the business a deduction for these lobbying
costs. Thus, businesses are taxed on the gross
amount of additional income which results from
these lobbying activities while they, in fact,
only receive a net amount of income (i.e., the dif-
ference between the increased income earned less
the cost of lobbying for the legislation’s passage).
On the other hand, the benefits resulting to non-
business taxpayers from the legislation—lower
utility bills and cleaner air—are not taxable. Cur-
rent law, correctly, denies the taxpayers that
receive these benefits, on which tax is not
imposed, from deducting the costs that produce
these benefits.96
The prior example illustrates the asymmetry
existing under current law. Business taxpayers are
required to use after-tax dollars in order to generate
pre-tax income. Nonbusiness taxpayers, on the
other hand, use after-tax dollars to create after-tax
benefits. The equal footing desired by the Court
in Cammarano is achieved only through a deduc-
tion for business lobbying when taxpayers are
allowed a tax deduction for expenditures that
allow them to generate taxable income, but are
required to spend after-tax dollars to produce
after-tax income or benefits. In that case, each dol-
lar of business profit in the above example could
offset a dollar of business lobbying expense. If Sec-
tion 162(e) were amended to correspond to this
maxim, lobbying expenses of business taxpayers
would not only be put on the same footing as lobby-
ing expenses of non-business taxpayer, but lobbying
expenses of business taxpayers would be put on the
95Supplemental and Minority Views of Senators Paul Douglas
and Albert Gore, 1962-3 C.B. 1092, 1117.
96On the other side of the issue, utilities and their customers
without solar panels are both likely to oppose such legislation.
The utilities will sell less energy and will likely pass on some
of the related loss of profits to the consumers, who will there-
fore face higher utility bills. For these taxpayers, whereas the
utility will generate higher profits (which are subject to tax) if
the legislation does not pass, the consumers will see no differ-
ence in their income tax bills if they are successful in keeping
their utility bills lower. The utilities therefore should be able
to offset the higher taxable income with the lobbying cost
that helps to generate that income, while the consumers should
not benefit from a tax deduction where no additional taxable
income results.
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same footing as other business expenses of those
taxpayers.
Finally, as we think about lobbying expenses as
either deductible or not deductible, we recognize
that most commentators start with the proposition
that the federal income tax is a tax on net income.97
Denying a deduction for an amount incurred by a tax-
payer in carrying on a trade or business is equivalent
to taxing gross income. And, although Congress
could impose a tax on gross income, our current sys-
tem does not do so.98 With respect to business taxpay-
ers, Section 162(a) allows for the reduction of gross
business income by all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business. By denying a deduc-
tion for lobbying expenses, Section 162(e) sets these
expenses apart from all other ordinary and necessary
business expenses, and distorts the computation of a
business taxpayer’s taxable income.
B. Public policy arguments
The fact that the lobbying disallowance cannot be
justified from a tax perspective means that it must
be grounded in an overriding public policy concern.
What this public policy concern is, however,
remains inarticulate and confused.
Congress advanced a reasoned rationale for
the 1962 legislation: (1) the need for tax parity,
(2) the unjustifiable distinction between the tax
treatment of administrative and executive lobby-
ing, on the one hand, and legislative lobbying, on
the other hand, and (3) the desirability of receiving
information bearing on the impact of present or
proposed legislation for business taxpayers. On
this basis, Congress narrowly tailored deductions
for direct legislative lobbying at all levels of
state and local government, but expressly denied
such deductions for business spending on politi-
cal campaigns and grassroots lobbying.99 Except-
ing political campaigns and grassroots lobbying
makes sense, if one accepts that there is inde-
pendent value to the information that Congress
receives from business taxpayers through lobby-
ing. In other words, it makes no sense if the only
possible use that can be made of the information
by legislators is to generate policy wins for those
providing it.
The 1993 amendments to Section 162(e), disal-
lowing deductions for direct lobbying at the state
and federal level, but retaining the deduction for
local lobbying, are much less articulate and do not
make the case for such a change.100
The House Report justifies the 1993 revisions to
162(e) as primarily designed to raise revenue.101
But there are practical and jurisprudential problems
with this interpretation. According to projections,
the provision was designed to raise approximate
97See David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing, 52 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1247 (2011), citing Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing
Power: A Reference Guide to the United States Con-
stitution 118 (2005); Charles A. Borek, The Public Policy
Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for Consistency in Denying
Deductions Arising From Illegal Activities, 22 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 45, 48 (1992). See also Griswold, An Argument Against
the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly Construed
as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142,
1147 (1943) (‘‘Taxation on net, not on gross, income has al-
ways been the broad basic policy of our income tax laws .
Net income may be defined as what remains out of gross in-
come after subtracting the ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in efforts to obtain or to keep it,’’ citing McDonald
v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1944) (dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Black).
The Committee Reports that accompanied the 1913 Reve-
nue Act specifically rejected a proposal to limit losses and de-
ductions to those incurred in a legitimate or lawful trade,
noting: ‘‘The object of this bill is to tax a man’s net income;
that is to say, what he has at the end of the year after deducting
from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform
men’s moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all.
The tax is not levied for the purpose of restraining people from
betting on horse races or upon ‘‘futures,’’ but the tax is framed
for the purpose of making a man pay upon his net income, his
actual profit during the year. The law does not care where he
got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law
may very properly care in another way.’’ 50 Cong. Rec.
3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams). See also J.S Seid-
man, Seidman’s Legislative History of f Income Tax
Laws, 1938–1961 at 994–97 (1938).
98Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 282 (1936).
99Given Congress’s deliberate decision not to overturn the,
then, 100-year old public policy objections to corporate politi-
cal spending, but to expressly distinguish such precedent with
regard to expensing business lobbying, it becomes clear pre-
cisely how extraordinary the Supreme Court’s decision to strike
down a ban on corporate political spending was in the Citizens
United decision.
100See H.R. Rep. No. 103–213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 111–128
(1993).
101See, supra, note 54.
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$635 million during the first five years after its
enactment—a modest sum in terms of federal budg-
eting even twenty years ago.102
But more importantly, it is very rarely justified to
deny a business taxpayer a deduction on public pol-
icy grounds. Before 1969, the Internal Revenue
Code itself did not include public policy exceptions
to the deductibility for ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses.103 The ‘‘public policy doctrine’’
developed under common law—until Congress
decided to codify certain exceptions deemed in vio-
lation of public policy. The Supreme Court summa-
rized the scope of the public policy doctrine in
Commissioner v. Tellier.104 In that case, the Court
allowed a taxpayer who was engaged in the busi-
ness of underwriting public stock offerings and
purchasing securities for resale to customers to
deduct legal fees paid to unsuccessfully defend him-
self against criminal charges in connection with
securities transactions as ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’
business expenses, stating that the public policy
doctrine would apply to prohibit a deduction only
where allowing the deduction would ‘‘frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscrib-
ing particular types of conduct.’’105 National or
state policies that are frustrated must be ‘‘evidenced
by some governmental declaration of them.’’106
Finally, according to the Court, the ‘‘test on nonde-
ductibility always is the severity and immediacy of
the frustration resulting from allowance of the
deduction.’’107
Congress, of course, is not limited by common
law considerations.108 But the Internal Revenue
Code reflects a similar reluctance to ‘‘mix [business
taxation with] morals and enforcement against non-
tax pursuits.’’109 As part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, Congress enacted three provisions pursuant
to which certain ordinary and necessary business
expenditures would be denied a deduction. Section
162(c) denied a deduction for the payment of illegal
bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal amounts. Sec-
tion 162(f) prevented a taxpayer from deducting
102
J. Comm. on Taxation, 103d Cong., Summary of the
Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1993 (H.R. 2264), 34 (JCS-11-93) (Aug. 23,
1993).
As with any legislation, the provisions disallowing a deduc-
tion for lobbying expenditures went through many iterations
before becoming law. Shortly after his State of the Union
Address, the Treasury Department released a narrative sum-
mary of the President’s proposal and estimated that it would
raise approximately $978 million over five years. But see
Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation, 103d Cong., Esti-
mated Budget Effects of the Administration’s Reve-
nue Proposals Contained in the Fiscal Year 1994
Budget (JCX-2-93) (May 4, 1993) (the Joint Committee es-
timated that President Clinton’s proposal would raise only
$873 million over the same period).
When the House of Representatives passed a version of the
budget in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(H.R. 2264), it included a proposal to eliminate the tax deduc-
tion for lobbying expenditures estimated to raise approximate-
ly $829 million over five years. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at
813 (1993). The Senate passed its own version of the budget,
including a variation of the provision covering lobbying ex-
penses that was broader in scope and more disadvantageous
to business. The Senate’s bill was estimated to raise $1.22 bil-
lion over five years. See Senate Comm. on the Budget,
103d Cong., Reconciliation Submissions of the
Instructed Committees Pursuant to the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget 435 (Comm. Print 1993).
103
S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1968), reprinted
in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2027, 2310. The
Code did explicitly allow for the deduction of direct lobbying
expenses, overturning the Supreme Court’s public policy doc-
trine in that respect in Cammarano and Textile Mills.
104383 U.S. 687 (1966).
105Id. at 694, quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,
473 (1943).
106Id., quoting Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
Stanley Surrey has speculated that the reason there were not
more tax penalties was that Congress was ‘‘wary of mixing mor-
als and enforcement against nontax pursuits.’’ See David I.
Walker, Suitable for Framing, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1247,
1259 (2011) (citing Stanley Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures 336–37 (1973).
107Id., quoting Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30, 35 (1958).
108See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693 (1966).
With respect to this point generally, and with respect to lobby-
ing expenditures specifically, the Court has stated:
Deduction of expenses falling within the general defini-
tion of s 162(a) may, to be sure, be disallowed by specific
legislation, since deductions ‘are a matter of grace and
Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.’
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S., at 28, 78 S.Ct. at
514 . The Court has also given effect to a precise and
longstanding Treasury Regulation prohibiting the deduc-
tion of a specified category of expenditures; an example
is lobbying expenses, whose nondeductibility was sup-
ported by considerations not here present. Textile Mills
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62
S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249; Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 79 S.Ct. 524, 3 L.Ed.2d 462.
In fact, at the time that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
enacted, many lobbying and political expenses were nondeduct-
ible. However, under the iteration of Section 163(e) that existed
at that time, certain direct lobbying expenses paid or incurred in
connection with carrying on a trade or business were deduct-
ible. Supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
109Supra note 107.
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fines or similar penalties paid to a governmental
entity. Section 162(g) disallowed a deduction for
two-thirds of the amount of the treble damages
paid under the antitrust laws. By codifying these nar-
row and specific public policy allowances, Congress
preempted courts from denying deductions on public
policy grounds.110
In each case, the rationale for prohibiting a
deduction was that a taxpayer should not receive a
tax benefit, or avoid the economic effect of a pen-
alty, for violating a federal or state policy expressly
set forth in a statute. Thus, for example, fines paid
by American Freightways (a trucking company) for
violating a state’s maximum weight laws would not
be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. Similarly, Wal-Mart should be prohibited
from deducting the payment of bribes to Mexican
government officials to speed up the process of
receiving building permits because such payments
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
It is certainly hard to see how a revenue raising
measure can be considered an overriding public pol-
icy concern. Direct lobbying of the type that we
argue should be deductible—lobbying coupled
with public disclosure of potentially valuable infor-
mation upon which legislators and the citizenry can
base their views—is neither expressly nor implicitly
prohibited by any federal or state statute. While
the courts, and many others, have long disfavored
the idea of business, and in particular, corporate lob-
bying, such lobbying activities are decidedly not
illegal in the same manner as the items that provide
for a disallowance of deductions in Sections 162(c),
(f), and (g).111
To the extent that Section 162(e) was amended
in 1993 to reduce business lobbying—which
the Clinton Treasury described as ‘‘inappropriate
because it subsidized corporations and special interest
groups which intervened in the legislative process’’—
current law reflects a public policy that is in direct
contradiction with the intent to increase legislative
lobbying by businesses under the 1962 amend-
ments.112 And yet, neither the Clinton Treasury,
nor the legislative history, explain why such lobby-
ing is deemed inappropriate. In its 1993 legislative
brief, the Clinton Treasury simply falls back on the
110See F. Phillip Manns, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section
162(f ): When Does the Payment of Damages to a Government
Punish the Payor? 13 Va. Tax Rev. 271, 277 (1993), citing S.
Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 273–76, reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. at 596–98 (‘‘The provision for the denial of the de-
duction for payments in these situations which are deemed to
violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public pol-
icy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly
defined to justify the disallowance of deductions.’’). As stated,
supra, at note 66, the legislative history also notes that lobbying
expenditures are also covered by tax law.
111 The authors recognize that, by focusing on the legality or il-
legality of a particular conduct, it is possible that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United and its ex-
pansive First Amendment jurisprudence in the campaign fi-
nance area, to argue that expenses for grassroots lobbying and
political spending by businesses should also be deductible. To do
so is beyond the scope of this Article. We do note, however, that
prior to this body of law, most of the activities covered by Section
162(e), with the exception of Section 162(e)(1)(A), were pro-
hibited under federal and/or state campaign finance laws.
112In this context, it is noteworthy that provisions enacted into the
tax code to effect taxpayer behavior often have the opposite effect.
A connection can be drawn between Section 162(e) and Section
162(m), which was also enacted as part of the Omnibus Reconci-
liation Act of 1993 in this regard. Congress enacted Section
162(m) in an attempt to deal with the perceived problem of exces-
sive executive compensation. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, x 13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–
71. The legislative history states that Section 162(m) was motivat-
ed by concerns regarding the amount of executive compensation
paid by public companies, and that the provision was intended
to reduce excessive compensation. See Staff of J. Comm. on
Taxation, 109TH Cong., Present Law and Background
Relating to Executive Compensation 6 (Comm. Print
2006). This provision generally disallows a tax deduction for com-
pensation paid to certain executives of publicly held corporations
in excess of $1 million unless such compensation is based on per-
formance.
Both Section 162(e) and Section 162(m) were enacted to
address similar public policy issues. Section 162(m) was
expected to address the agency problem in publicly traded
companies. Simply put, where a publicly traded corporation
does not have a controlling shareholder, there is a concern
that the top corporate executives ‘‘have almost complete
discretion in management.’’ See Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. of Econ. Perspectives 71 (2003), citing
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property 139
(1932). Where such an agency problem exists, Professors
Bebchuk and Fried have argued that executive compensa-
tion is inefficient and excessive. Bebchuk and Fried,
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Executive Compensation (2004). For a discussion of
these arguments and opposing arguments, see Stuart Lazar, The
Unreasonable Case for a Reasonable Compensation Standard
in the Public Company Context: Why It Is Unreasonable to Insist
on Reasonableness, 59 Buff. L. Rev. 937, 944–952 (2011).
Their ‘‘managerial power’’ theory states that compensation paid
to corporate executives have often ‘‘deviated from arm’s-length
contracting because directors have been influenced by manage-
ment, sympathetic to executives, insufficiently motivated to bar-
gain over compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing
compensation.’’ Bebchuk and Fried at 4.
(Continued)
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Supreme Court’s reasoning based on tax parity in
Cammarano and on Cammarano’s general denun-
ciation of lobbying, without giving any serious
attention to the 1962 legislative history addressing
this issue, or any of the voluminous political sci-
ence literature on legislative lobbying as an infor-
mation subsidy accumulated up until that time.
This stands in stark contrast to the detailed debate
and analysis of the effects of the legislation passed
by the Congress in 1963.
The presumption is that lobbying, and the lobby-
ing deduction, distort the political process in favor
of ‘‘special interests,’’ as stated by President Clin-
ton. Clinton called for eliminating the deduction as
part of a package of campaign finance reforms that
would ‘‘reduce the power of special interests and
increase the participation of the people.’’113 But by
treating direct lobbying the same as political spend-
ing, the 1993 amendments undercut the reasoned dis-
tinction between influencing elections and public
opinion, on the one hand, and providing direct lobby-
ing, on the other hand, that the Congress made in
1962. The present statute does not in any way con-
template the desirability of providing Congress
with information and equates informing and educat-
ing Congress with political spending.
In the following Part, we argue that the 87th Con-
gress and the 111th Congress both had it right—but
only in part.
V. INFORMATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD
Members of Congress, who labor under ever-
greater demands on their time and resources,114
continue to view lobbyists as invaluable resources
who provide them with costly policy information,
political intelligence, and support.115 This is consis-
tent with ‘‘a growing research consensus’’ which
focuses on the roles of lobbyists ‘‘in providing infor-
mation and [.] technical expertise in affecting the
terms of a policy debate and the reactions of decision
makers to the appeals of advocates.’’116 As Richard
Briffault notes, lobbying advises legislators about
conditions in particular industries, geographic areas,
or socio-economic groups; the costs and benefits of
proposed laws and regulations; the consequences of
the government actions under consideration; and the
views of those affected by potential government deci-
sions.117 Moreover, this information is important both
for legislation and congressional oversight of the fed-
eral bureaucracy.118
Uncritical versions of the information subsidy
theory conclude prematurely that lobbyists thereby
provide a collective or public good. Some political
scientists have argued that the information conveyed
by lobbyists—information that is not otherwise avail-
able to the government—can improve the government
decision process, thereby improving welfare.119 After
all, information has public goods characteristics in
(footnote 112 continued.) In his first State of the Union Address,
President Clinton stated that one of his goals in pushing for the
end of the tax deduction for ‘‘special interest lobbying’’ was a de-
sire to ‘‘reduce the power of special interests and increase the par-
ticipation of the people.’’ See, supra, note 91. President Clinton’s
concern about increasing the participation of the people has a
similar tone to that of Professors Bebchuk and Fried in granting
more power to the shareholders—providing a feeling that Section
162(e) and Section 162(m) were designed to combat similar
agency problems. Section 162(m) was created to prevent corpo-
rate officers from taking a tax deduction when they set their own
salary in situations that might be in conflict with their sharehold-
ers; Section 162(e) was enacted to prevent business taxpayers
from deducting expenses incurred in lobbying the legislature in
situations in which those taxpayers are involved influencing the
creation of legislation from which they will benefit.
Whether caused by the passage of tax legislation, the result has
been the same. Numerous commentators have noted that Section
162(m) has had the unintended consequence of increasing exec-
utive compensation at publicly held corporations. See Lazar, at
985. While there is no similar suggestion that Section 162(e)
has increased the amount of money being spent on lobbying,
there is certainly no suggestion that there is less money being de-
voted to lobbying in 2013 than there was in 1993.
113During the 1992 election, $3.2 billion were spent on elec-
tions, a 19 percent increase over amounts spent in the 1988
election cycle. Ross Perot, who opted out of public funding
early in the election, relying on personal funds, garnered over
18 percent of all votes in the election, causing the Republicans
to lose the White House. And new regulations requiring, for the
first time, the disclosure of soft-money, influenced overall po-
litical spending estimates and focused public attention on cam-
paign finance and, in particular, on large donations to the
parties. Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado,
Financing the 1992 Election 1, 150–51 (1995). The New
York Times reported that soft-money had ‘‘grown from a rela-
tively inconsequential aspect of Presidential campaigning to a
dominant one.’’ Stephen Labaton, The 1992 Campaign: Cam-
paign Finances; Despite Economy, Clinton Sets Record for
Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1992.
114
Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek, and Frances
E. Lee, Congress and Its Members (2012).
115
Levine, supra note 3.
116
Baumgartner, et al., supra note 1.
117Briffault, supra note 9; Sussman, supra note 3.
118Id.
119Richard Ball, Interest Groups, Influence, and Welfare, 7
Econ. & Pol. 119 (1995).
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that, once disclosed, anyone can make use of the infor-
mation for their own purposes.120 Lobbying could
thus generate positive externalities or spillover
effects.121 The 87th Congress appears to have based
the deduction for direct lobbying, at least in part, on
the view that the information provided by lobbyists
helps Congress, as a whole, do a better job.122 The
view that lobbying provides such an informational
public good prevails among many legislators, profes-
sionals, and scholars.123 Moreover, even sophisticated
analyses slide back into language that can easily be
misread in this way.124 At the naı̈ve extreme, however,
such a view fails to consider the nature of the informa-
tion that is provided, to whom it is provided, how, and
in what institutional settings.
A substantial portion of the political science lit-
erature—descriptive, empirical, and formal—has
attended to precisely these questions.125 A widely
accepted articulation of the ‘‘legislative subsidy the-
ory’’ by Hall and Deardorff, for example, argues
that lobbying operates as ‘‘a matching grant’’ of
costly information and resources to ‘‘the enterprises
of strategically selected legislators.’’126 Lobbyists
do provide critical policy (and other) information
to legislators, but primarily to legislators who
already agree with them.127 ‘‘The proximate objec-
tive of this strategy is not to change legislators’
minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their
own, coincident objectives.’’128 While this makes
it look as if the likeminded legislators were working
on behalf of the lobbyists’ client or interest group, in
fact, the legislators are working on behalf of them-
selves.129
Hall and Deardorff provide an alternative to the
popular view that lobbyists succeed by pressuring
legislators to do their bidding (the ‘‘persuasion the-
ory’’), or that they can ‘‘buy’’ votes by making cam-
paign contributions (the ‘‘exchange theory’’).130
But, in so doing, Hall and Deardorff (and this liter-
ature in general) also call into question the simple
view that business lobbying provides an informa-
tional public good.
It is not merely, as Hall and Deardorff themselves
point out, that ‘‘subsidies help legislators to work
harder primarily on behalf of the interest that can
afford the high costs,’’ that is, the business groups
which exhibit a tremendous predominance and
imbalance of financial resources in federal lobby-
ing.131 Whatever else it does, business lobbying
does provide critical information and policy exper-
tise to legislators. Critical information about mar-
kets and industry remains critical information, even
if resources are lacking to support non-business
interests.132
What the literature shows, but does not always
recognize explicitly, is that information asymmetries
and the strategic use of information distort and
undermine the value of such information—even
assuming that it is all ‘‘good information’’ in the
nature of policy expertise, datasets, and scientific
analyses that business interests and their lobbyists
120See, e.g., Wawro, supra note 16, at 3.
121Hamid Mohtadi and Terri Roe, Growth, Lobbying and Public
Goods, 14 European J. Polit. Econ. 453 (1998) (arguing that
lobbying by self-motivated individuals may improve welfare
when it entails significant spillovers to other citizens that ex-
ceed the social cost of lobbying, but concluding that agents
lobby either too much or too little).
122Supra note 89–90 and accompanying text. See also, Nick
Allard, The Seven Deadly Virtues of Lobbyists: What Lawyer
Lobbyists Really Do, 13 Election L. J. 210–219 (2014)
(‘‘The first thing lobbyists do is provide information to the gov-
ernment to inform its decisions. This is the best understood and
most widely discussed functions of lobbyists.’’).
123See LaPira, supra note 22, at 4–8; Jeffrey M. Berry, The
New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizens Groups
(1999) (lobbyists ‘‘help representatives do a better job as repre-
sentatives.’’); Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 81 (stating
that most legislators say ‘‘lobbyists provide me with informa-
tion.’’ ‘‘They help me do a better job.’’)
124
Wawro, supra note 16, at 21 (‘‘An LE contributes his or her
own resources and coordinates the resources of others to supply
[informational] collective goods.’’).
125See, e.g., Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1; Baumgartner
et al., supra note 1; Wawro supra note 16; Epstein and
O’Halloran, supra note 8, Lapira, supra note 22; Austen-
Smith, supra note 4 for reviews of the literature.
126Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 69.
127Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball, Organized Interests
and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress, 42 Am.
Poli. Sci. Rev. 775, 775 (1998) (‘‘most scholars agree that
groups lobby their friends in the legislature’’).
128Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 74.
129Id. at 81.
130It is worth noting that the ‘‘exchange theory’’ in its crud-
est form has found support among progressive and conser-
vative legal scholars. Richard Posner and William Landes,
for example, state that in the legislative process, laws are
sold for ‘‘campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises
of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes.’’ The Inde-
pendent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& Econ. 875 (1975). This finds no support in any of the em-
pirical literature on Congress, or professional literature on
lobbying.
131Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 81.
132Policymaking is not a zero-sum game, although it is often
treated as such. In this volume, Heather Gerken and Alex Tau-
sanovich argue for a public finance system for lobbying Con-
gress, which would address the problem of financial imbalance.
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are providing.133 The information asymmetry
between legislators and lobbying interests, which is
widely recognized in the literature,134 leads to
moral hazard. Legislators have limited time and
resources to understand or verify the accuracy of
the information provided. Business (and other) inter-
ests can thus act opportunistically by providing infor-
mation selectively, or framing complex empirical
evidence by self-serving interpretation. Knowing
this, legislators will discount valuable information
so provided, because they will not be able to assess
the quality of the information.
One practical solution to this information
asymmetry problem is a type of reputational
bonding.135 Experienced professionals assert that
a lobbyist who provides bad or even deceptive
information will be excluded from the process per-
manently.136 This supports the information subsidy
theory. But it raises further problems. It suggests
that legislators will discount information that is not
provided through such lobbyists—like, for example,
information coming directly from businesses and
corporations—because such information is not
bonded in this immediate fashion. And this curious
fact, which flies in the face of popular theories of
the dominance of business interests, is, in fact,
observed.137
Other internal mechanisms exist to overcome
this information asymmetry problem. Recall that
lobbyists do not publicly disclose the informa-
tion they receive, but provide it to strategically
selected legislators.138 These legislators, referred
to as ‘‘legislative entrepreneurs’’ (LEs) in the liter-
ature, specialize in a particular policy area and
commit their resources to providing their informa-
tion and policy expertise to other legislators.139
Such LE’s either already occupy leading positions
on committees and subcommittees, or are moti-
vated by rising in the congressional ranks.140 As
a result of greater specialization, such LEs and
their staff will be in a better position to assess the
value of the information that they receive from
businesses and their lobbyists. But this only gives
rise to a second set of information asymmetries
between LEs and other legislators leading to simi-
lar problems. The other legislators, including those
with policy expertise in other areas, rely upon the
LE’s expertise in collecting, filtering, and assem-
bling such information in their particular area of
expertise.141 To the extent that LE’s have their
own (personal and policy) goals, their opportunis-
tic behavior will include managing information
strategically.142 Such behavior includes withhold-
ing information (in whole or in part), delaying or
timing information disclosure to prevent others
from making independent use or being able to ade-
quately digest and respond to the information, and
structuring legislative debates to avoid certain
arguments or make these arguments more difficult
133Hall and Deardorff do not, in fact, make this argument in
their 2006 article.
134See Epstein and O’Halloran, supra note 8.
135The same is true for knowledge transfer in market settings.
‘‘Markets for knowledge and information . depend critically
on reputation, on repeated interactions, and on trust.’’ Erica
Gorga and Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Insti-
tutions, and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based
Theory of the Firm, 101 Northw. L. Rev. 1123, 1169 (2007);
Ashish Arora and Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms,
Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 Indus. & Corp.
Change 451, 470 (2004).
136This is commonplace in the profession. See, e.g., < http://
www.meyersandassociates.com/lobbyist.html > (‘‘A lobbyist’s
success is based totally on his or her reputation and credibility.
Giving bad advice or incorrect information to Congress is
quickly noted and long remembered. In the lobby world, you
are given only one chance to make a mistake and lose the cred-
ibility that’s necessary for success.’’).
137Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry,
Marie Hojnacki, and David C. Kimball, Organized Interests
and Issue Definition in Policy Debates, in Interest Group
Politics 275, 278 (Cigler and Loomis eds. 2002) (‘‘Corpo-
rations are essentially suspect and will often fund work at think
tanks because something published under their name has limit-
ed credibility’’).
138See also Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball, Organized
Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress, 42
Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 775, 775 (1998).
139
Wawro, supra note 16, at 4–5. See also Leech, et al., supra
note 138, at 282 (‘‘Most research produced by interest groups is
intended for a smaller audience—key policymakers who have
authority over the issue at hand.’’).
140
Wawro, supra note 16. Note that subject matter specializa-
tion is much more prevalent in the House of Representatives.
Senators, who tend to be generalists are much more reliant on
knowledgeable personal and committee staff. Walter J.
Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy
Process 30–31 (2014).
141
Wawro, supra note 16.
142Gorga and Halberstam, supra note 136, at 1168–1170 (de-
scribing moral hazards specific to knowledge resources in
firms); see, e.g., Oleszek, et al., supra note 96, at 106 (‘‘Com-
mittee jurisdictions are akin to property rights [over issues], and
few things in Washington are more closely guarded, or as fer-
vently pursued.’’) (citing David C. King, Turf Wars: How
Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction 11
(1997)).
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for their opponents to make.143 Such behavior need
not be viewed as unprofessional or unethical, but—to
the extent it remains within the rules of the game—a
valid tactic to promote ones interests and frame
issues for decision in an adversarial system or nego-
tiation. In an adversarial system (or a negotiation) it
is the role of the adversary (or counterparty) to make
their case.
These are just some of the problems with the
assumption of frictionlessness that underlies the
view that information provided to Congress through
lobbying somehow produces positive externalities
and ends up serving the ‘‘public interest.’’
VI. POLICY PROPOSAL
The standard response to the information prob-
lems of imperfect markets is regulation and, in
particular, regulation that increases the ready avail-
ability of good information.144 One example is the
securities disclosure regime that was established
as part of the second wave of New Deal regulation.
These disclosure regimes generally require the dis-
closure of information both to government officials
and directly to consumers. Since the rise of the mod-
ern administrative state in the 1930s, disclosure
regimes have become a critical and pervasive strat-
egy of public and private lawmaking. Over time,
disclosure regimes and information transparency
rules have become central to the U.S. regulation
of the financial markets, public health, public safety,
labor relations, labor conditions, the environment,
government integrity, and elections.
To date, however, almost no consideration has
been given to address the information asymmetries
of lobbying by regulating the scope, tools, and tim-
ing of the substantive information and expertise that
businesses and their lobbyists provide Congress.
There is no requirement or standard for publishing
the substance of any information, data, or policy
analysis that lobbying provides to legislators or con-
gressional committees. This is not merely true for
information that lobbyists share with individual leg-
islators in private meetings. But it also includes their
reviews of proposed legislation, proposals for new
federal programs or activities, written testimony
and materials submitted to congressional commit-
tees, pre-introduction research undertaken by various
individuals and groups to ensure that a proposed bill
avoids unintended consequences, and private com-
munications with committee members and staff
before and during markup, and with House-Senate
conference committee members and staff.145
Many of these substantive communications about
legislative matters proceed in secrecy. Unlike the
administrative comment process, there are almost
no rules governing this type of input into the develop-
ment of legislation. The requirements for disclosing
any of this information are limited. Indeed, congres-
sional committees are entitled to draft and mark up
legislation relying entirely on this type of ex parte
communication, given that there is no requirement
that legislation (other than annual budget resolutions)
be drafted, in whole or in part, based on hearing tes-
timony. Current lobbying regulations require only
lobbyist registration, the disclosure of their clients,
the moneys spent on lobbying, a very limited identi-
fication of the issues of lobbying concern, and similar
information. But such regulation does not target the
information problems described above.
If the information that lobbying supplies is
critical to lawmaking—and there is good rea-
son to believe so146—then such lobbying should
be encouraged, and the information should be
treated as the valuable resource that it is.147
143Leech, et al., supra note 138, at 285.
144As information economics has long established, this does
not mean that conditions of perfect information can be approx-
imated.
145Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Lawmaking: A Perspective
on Secrecy and Transparency, Congressional Research Service
7-5700, R42108, Nov. 30, 2011.
146Public as well as private decision makers, and indeed all
organizations, depend on costly knowledge resources to
accomplish their goals. Government and the private sector (es-
pecially big businesses) spend vast sums of money to generate
knowledge and information. Just as ‘‘knowledge resources are
tantamount to the whole business enterprise,’’ in a knowledge
economy, see Gorga and Halberstam, supra note 136, at 1225,
knowledge resources are tantamount to the ability of legisla-
tors (and government more generally) to generate public pol-
icy for a large, complex, modern society with a highly
advanced national economy.
147We recognize that certain information used in the legislative
process may be proprietary and, as a result, firms could suffer a
competitive disadvantage, if that information were shared. See
Gorga and Halberstam, supra note 136 at 1127. The proposal
does not require the disclosure of all lobbying communications.
To the extent that a taxpayer wishes to protect the confidential-
ity of firm internal information, the ability is retained, though at
a cost—the inability to take a tax deduction with respect to such
information provided to legislators or their staff. This ‘‘nudge’’
approach avoids the kinds of First Amendment problems that
any requirement of information sharing or any prohibition on
lobbying would raise.
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As one of the most experienced lobbyists in
Washington, DC notes:
If the public’s true concern is asymmetry in
the system, where some moneyed interests
have more lobbying clout, then the answer is
to endeavor to afford the underrepresented
more lobbying clout. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the counterintuitive solution to the
problem of undue influence is more lobbying,
not less. Instead of trying to limit the use of
expert advocacy, we should find ways to give
the less advantaged a louder voice in the legis-
lative and regulatory processes. Universal
access to lobbying provides a check on special
access and unfair influence and helps to hold
lawmakers accountable. Thus, rather than
determining ways to restrict lobbying, we
should consider ways to increase access to
public policy advocacy.148
We therefore propose that businesses should be
encouraged to provide information to Congress,
but only if the information is publicly disclosed in
a timely fashion. Not just hearing testimony, but
all communications about the substance of a bill
with legislators, their staff, and committee staff,
should be deductible, so long as the information is
disclosed publicly. Activities such as grassroots lob-
bying, election spending (including the type of issue
advertising that the McCain-Feingold Bill defined
as ‘‘electioneering communications’’ before the
Supreme Court eviscerated the category) should
not be deductible.149 In short, we believe that
some portion of the version of Section 162(e),
allowing for a deduction for oral and written testi-
mony submitted to a legislative body, should be
reinstated provided that such information is publicly
disclosed so that its value can be used by all.
How should such information be disclosed?
Ideally, the Library of Congress or the Congres-
sional Research Service would create a database
similar to the ‘‘JAMES system’’ that Lee Drutman
has proposed in a publication by The Brookings
Institution. Drutman conceived of it as a supplement
to the current THOMAS System (found at < http://
thomas.loc.gov > ), which makes legislation avail-
able online every time a bill is introduced. The
JAMES system, however, would function as a
kind of ‘‘modern variation on notice-and-comment
rulemaking for the legislative process,’’ providing
a web-based ‘‘forum for lobbyists, constituents,
and other interested parties to publicly and transpar-
ently debate legislation and, in the process, provide
congressional staff, journalists, and the public
access to the best available arguments, information,
and ideas about public policy—all in a way that is
easily searchable and sortable.’’150 Different users
would use the system differently. Lobbyists would
be required to disclose whom they are advocating
for. Members of Congress would be entitled to
post pages that make the case for a particular bill.
The system would also provide a tool for legislators
to manage their constituency input in a more sophis-
ticated manner.151 A public online forum would be
able to aggregate, rank, and escalate comments by
individuals.
The many problems associated with such online
systems of information management would require
careful development based on existing forums such
as Wikipedia, using advanced non-SQL languages
pioneered by Facebook and Google.152 These details
are beyond the scope of this article.
148Allard, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 122, at (This issue).
Heather K. Gerken and Alex Tausanovich address this issue prac-
tically in their provocative proposal for a public financing system
for lobbying in this issue. A Public Finance Model for Lobbying:
Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democ-
racy 13 Elect. L. J. 75–90 (2014). From a public choice perspec-
tive, the puzzle may indeed be why there is so little money in
lobbying, given the stakes. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de
Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr., Why is There so Little
Money in U.S. Politics? 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 105 (2003)
(raising this question with regard to campaign contributions).
149What makes the idea of allowing large businesses to expense
lobbying costs objectionable is the connection between lobby-
ing and campaign finance. Where businesses are able to exert
undue pressure on legislators with the help of now unlimited
campaign spending, and their lobbyists are the very same peo-
ple who direct large campaign spending, legislators who ulti-
mately ought to decide the issue on the merits will be forced
to decide the issue based on their personal desire for reelection.
See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 5, at 100–108.
150Drutman, supra note 18, at 5–9.
151Lawmakers already employ a variety of high-tech devices
and techniques for communicating with constituents. Oleszek,
supra note 140, at 36; Saci Zavattaro, Members Seeing Advant-
age of Plugging Into Blogosphere, National Journal’s Con-
gress Daily AM, October 25, 2005, 8.
152The focus of database developers is on integrating data by
using software that can integrate many different data sets and
data formats from different and previously non-compatible
sources that does not require the advance specification of
data-fields that was required by SQL languages. See, e.g.,
Pramod J. Sadalage and Martin Fowler, NoSQL
Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Emerging World of
Polyglot Peristence (2013).
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How would such publication mitigate current
information asymmetry and adverse selection prob-
lems? Critical information would become available
to all legislators and outside groups. Real-time, online
publication would create a forum where such infor-
mation can be readily vetted, countered, simplified,
and considered in its implications by others (includ-
ing opposing interest groups, academics, the execu-
tive, administrative agencies, individuals, and small
businesses). This would make it harder to deploy
information strategically during the process.
Will the publication of industry specific informa-
tion and data merely overwhelm the public? Profes-
sor Lessig has made a similar argument with regard
to the financial disclosure of lobbying activities,153
and concludes that ‘‘[n]ot only does the ‘informa-
tion’ revealed not necessarily inform, but the most
important influences in the system would not nec-
essarily be revealed.’’154 There are a number of
responses to this question. First, and foremost, the
disclosure of written lobbying communications is
not primarily intended to reveal who influences
whom—although it will enhance this type of disclo-
sure as well—but to make public substantive lobby-
ing information so as to increase the public benefit
of such information and decrease its private bene-
fits. Second, we cannot see any benefit that accrues
to the public from keeping such information secret,
given that legislators, who are lobbied, already
use it in the legislative process. Third, the broader,
educated public generally relies on intermediaries,
including journalists, bloggers, professional asso-
ciations, public interest groups, think tanks, other
lobbyists, and academic experts to play an impor-
tant role in making sense of complex data and pub-
lic policy information. Especially at the federal
level, where legislation has significant conse-
quences nationwide, there are almost always sophis-
ticated coalitions of interests on both sides of any
issue.155 Thus Lessig’s critique of a more limited
financial transparency is also unfair because nei-
ther journalists nor the broader public need to ana-
lyze lists of contributors and their donations by
themselves. Intermediaries, like the Center for
Responsive Politics’ database and website OpenSe-
crets.org, have specialized in organizing, maintain-
ing, and analyzing such data.
But why give businesses a tax break to do some-
thing they do anyway, that is, spend billions of
dollars lobbying Congress? As already noted, it
is the right thing to do from a tax standpoint. If
corporations are spending these dollars, proper
tax accounting should allow them to offset those
expenses against their revenue in determining tax-
able income. These and other arguments from a tax
perspective have been addressed in the previous
section.
Moreover, the assumption that the lobbying
deduction would not change behavior is just
that. First, we are not arguing that a tax deduction
would encourage the creation of more informa-
tion. Rather, the tax deduction would encourage
businesses and their lobbyists to publicize the sub-
stantive information they provide legislators—
something they currently do not do. They would
thus come closer to actually providing an informa-
tional public good.
Second, such a tax deduction for direct lobbying
may also encourage more small and medium-sized
business owners to participate more directly in pro-
viding information to Congress. The difference
between a deductible and an out-of-pocket expense
to attend a congressional hearing may make a differ-
ence to these parties currently underrepresented in
the process.
Finally, regardless of the deductibility or nonde-
ductibility of any particular lobbying expenditure,
the money will likely be spent in Washington in
any case. But if businesses and their lobbyists can
spend it on something that is deductible, as opposed
to something that is not, they are likely to choose the
type of spending they can expense. Jasper Cum-
mings has suggested that when Congress took
away the deduction for direct lobbying, it may
have shifted some of that money to other activities.
Not allowing the deduction does not draw these
expenditures out of the system. It may, however,
mean that this money will go to expenditures, such
as grassroots lobbying or campaign expenditures
which are much more controversial (and which
have never been deductible).
Why not simply legislate lobbying disclosure
rules for substantive information? Our proposal
reflects a compromise. Tying tax breaks for business
to disclosure of substantive lobbying information
may have a better chance of passage than a mandate
153Baumgartner et al. supra note 1, at 251–260 (arguing that fi-
nancial disclosures are insufficient because they provide both
too much and too little information).
154Id. at 260.
155Id.
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or other proposed lobbying reforms. It alters the
choice architecture of business lobbying to encour-
age routine disclosure of written lobbying commu-
nications; and it puts the management of written
lobbying communications via an online transpar-
ency and information system like Lee Drutman’s
‘‘JAMES’’ system back on the table.
Moreover, relying on a tax deduction to channel
information avoids running into First Amendment
problems. The political speech of lobbyists and
their clients would not be burdened by refusing
them a tax deduction under these circumstances.
This is not to say that we would discourage the
amendment of Senate and House rules to confer
responsibility on legislators, committees, and staff-
ers to ensure that outside information is made avail-
able online just like the federal courts now use the
PACER system for all court filings and judicial
orders. Indeed, Congress has a great interest in
such transparency reforms, given the record levels
of public distrust it currently engenders.156
Why can’t legislators turn to government (admin-
istrative agencies, the Congressional Research
Service) to supply the relevant expertise? Why not
simply increase each legislator’s legislative staff?
Legislators do rely heavily on information provided
by executive agencies, but government cannot pro-
vide its own feedback. Different sources produce
different substantive information. Large reinsurers,
for example, will have unparalleled insight into
how a tax provision might impact the national rein-
surance markets. Moreover, to the extent that legisla-
tors lack a clear understanding, it is the private
reinsurers who have a compelling incentive, the nec-
essary resources, and the best access to the data, to
generate substantive information about the issue in
a timely manner. Moreover, the information is not
just available for free in the public domain. In the
private sector, good information is generally pro-
prietary, costly, and not freely shared with others.157
VII. CONCLUSION
We recognize that the proposed policy does not
address all problems associated with the distortion
of the legislative process by large moneyed inter-
ests. It is a limited, incremental change that we
believe is more feasible politically, than other
wholesale reforms, such as the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s proposed lobbying reforms. Unlike the
focus on curbing money in politics, it recognizes
the reality that all participants in the process
observe: namely, that legislators depend on the
costly information that lobbying and lobbyists pro-
vide. With this information already part of the sys-
tem, bringing such information to light only can
help improve the legislative process.
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156Professor Lessig reports that ‘‘75 percent of Americans be-
lieve ‘campaign contributions buy results in Congress.’ Three
to one, with Republicans (71 percent) just as convinced of
this as Democrats (81 percent).’’ Lawrence Lessig, Republic
Lost 132–33 (2012).
157Gorga and Halberstam, supra note 136, at 1123–6. Fung et al.,
supra note 15, at 33.
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